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(ii) 
ABSTRACT 
The constitutionality of affirmative action in terms of section 8 of Act 200 of 1993 is investigated. 
The study contends that in constitutional interpretation it is permissible to have recourse to 
ethical precepts as long as these are anchored within the four corners of the Constitution. It is 
contended that the •equality clause• does not prescribe equality of outcome in favour of 
substantive equality of opportunity. It is asserted that group-based affirmative action may 
justifiably be attacked as being unconstitutional; either on the basis that it infringes the non-
beneficiary's equality rights in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) or that it falls beyond the 
constitutional protection afforded to affirmative action in terms of section 8(3). Furthermore, 
group-based modalities of affirmative action may also not constitute a permissible limitation on 
the fundamental right to equality, if compared to an individual-based socio-economic affirmative 
action model. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Affirmative action: The term affirmative action is used in many different guises and it is not readily] 
apparent what a person means when employing the term. It may indeed be that the context in which 
and the words chosen to describe whatever the speaker may mean, tell us more about his bias than the 
actual meaning of the term. 1 In this study affirmative action is viewed as those pro-active and remedial 1 
measures designed to bridge the gap between formal equality of opportunity and substantive equality 
of opportunity. Viewed thus, affirmative action comes to the fore in a society in which the stage has been 
!eac:hed that the law does not discriminate, but societal discrimination and the present effects of past 
discrimination are still prevalent. The concepts "equality" and "affirmative action" are both susceptible to 
conflicting interpretations. In a sense the ambiguity that inheres in these concepts is doubly unfortunate, 
firstly, because of the conceptual confusion this leads to and, secondly, because of the importance 
attached to these concepts in the public debate (and the capacity to engender a sense of social injustice 
and to threaten social stability). At the root of the controversy and complexity of the concept affirmative 
action are differing notions of "equality". For some it may mean the ideal of an egalitarian society and 
for others a society characterised by the allocation of social goods according to just deserts. Whereas 
the debate around discrimination appeals to people's sense of justice in arguing for the extension of 
basic liberties, the denial of which offends against most civilized notions of morality, the affirmative action 
debate is much less clear cut and forces us to question our stance on some of the most basic questions 
about social justice and human rights. This may explain the apparent paradox that while people may be 
in full agreement with the morality of and necessity for affirmative action, they can hold negative opinions 
on any specific affirmative programme. 2 
1.2. The controversial nature of affirmative action: •Affirmative action is a battleground for competing J v 
values, especially competing concepts of distributive justice. 83 Libertarianism's claim !hat merit should 
be the universal principle of distributive justice can be questioned. Firstly, there is the problem of 
defining merit4 and the influence of culture on the definer of merit which seems to make it a less than 
1 For example, •protection against discrimination', •compensatoty redress•, •preferential treatment' or •nwe/S9 discrimination• 
am all indicative of a certain bias. Starks criticizes the terms "benign discrimination• and •reverse discrimination•, • ... as an 
inappropriate and misleading way to describe affirmative action. The goal is not to injure or insult white males or to place them 
in an inferior status in relation to minorities, but to aid minorities only to a limited degree and in limited ciroumstances for the 
purpose of furthering racial equality" [Starks S.L: ·understanding Government affirmative action and Metro Broadcasting Inc. v 
Fee· in Duke Law Journal Vol. 41, 1992: pp 933-975: p 939]. 
2Tay/or's empirical researoh shows this to be true for American white males (1991: p 133). Also see Brown D.R. & Gray G.R.: 
'Not Making EEO the Scapegoat' in SuoeTVisorv Management May 1990: pp 8-9: p 9: "Surwys show that virtually evety0ne 
supports EEO and endorses AA in the abstract. However, when you get down to concrete specifics, ... , that support crumbles.• 
3Tay/or (1991): p xv. 
"See, for instance, Dworkin's argument that the university's refusal to allow Bakke despite his having higher grades than some 
of the minority groups who were admitted to the medical school, can be justified on bases other than the traditional notion of 
merit, that is, the fact that a black could well tum out to be a better doctor in a black community than a white doctor, despite the 
fact that the latter has •greater merit' as understood by traditional admission policies {Dworkin R. (1978): Taking Rights Seriously 
Cambridge: Harvan:f University Press (5th Ed): p 230]. 
2 
objective standard by which to allocate goods. Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of merit as a 
criterion of distribution in certain circumstances.5 Thirdly, the question should be asked whether merit 
is a socially desirable criterion since it may have undesirable societal consequences.a Fourthly, a further 
source of controversy is the criteria for defining the distributive values used to guide the allocation of 
social goods and resources. For Williams, prevailing standards are nothing more than collective, 
subjective preferences7, and are, as such, suspect and open to the challenge that they are reflective 
of pervasive prejudice. Although there may be consensus about what value shall serve as basis of a 
distribution, there may be a considerable sense of injustice about the criteria that are used to define the 
value.a Within a community, affirmative action may enjoy a generally high degree of acceptance, as a 
value in itself, on which to base job allocations, but there may exist an equally great resistance to the 
criteria used to identify the beneficiaries of affirmative action (for example group-based criteria versus 
actual victims of past discrimination).9 
1.3. Ethical theories and constitutional Interpretation: In this section it will be argued that in the 
context of a constitutional equality provision, ethical theories can play a very important role to inform 
the Courts. An equal protection clause in a Bill of Rights constitutionalizes the norm of equality, but how 
are the Courts to give effect to this norm and what is the role of phUosophical interpretations of equality 
in this endeavour, if any? In order to answer this question one first needs to determine how the 
philosophical discourse on equality differs from that of the judge presiding on a constitutional matter. 
A proper ethical solution of a problem Is not necessarily a permissible legal solution, since courts in 
arriving at a decision are largely guided by authoritative texts. This results in the constitutional judge 
being more constrained in his range of permissible options than the philosopher since ethical reasoning 
5Deutsch M. (1985): Distributive Justice: A Social-psycho/oalca/ Perspective New Haven: Yale University Press: pp ~30. 
a •... I believe we must begin to challenge the assumptions underlying the competitive, meritocratic ideology of our society • 
.•. Finally, we must raise the central question: if the competitive grading system in our schools - a less corrupted version of a 
competitive merit system than the one that characterizes our larger society - does not foster a social environment that is 
conducive to social we/I-being and effective social control, why would one expect that such values would be fostered in a society 
that is dominated by a competitive, meritocratic ideology? If the competitive-hierarchical atmosphere is not good for our children, 
is it good for us?" [Deutsch (1985): p 221). · 
7
"Standarr:/s are concrete monuments to socially accepted subjective preference• (Williams P.J.: The Alchemy of Race and 
Rights Cambridge: Harvarr:I University Press, 1991: p 99). These sentiments are echoed by Asma/ in a paper delivered at the 5th· 
Annual Labour Law Conference held in Durban from 16 to 18 July 1992 (Asma/ K.: "Affirmative Action or Not?" unpublished paper 
Durban 1992.) 
8
"There are also different ways of evaluating equality in the same homogeneous space, using distinct methods of measuring 
inequality. Variations in inequality indicators in a given space (e.g. coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, standard deviation of 
logarithms, measures of entropy) have been extensively discussed in the literature. The ideas underlying the discipline of 
measurement VcVy greatly among the different measures, and while many of these ideas have good reasons behind them, they 
often conflict with each other. Different features of basal equality can, therefore, suggest different rankings of particular situations• 
[Sen (1992): p 132]. 
9/nterestingly, Taylerfound in his research that whereas affirmative action as an abstractgenera/lzalion enjoys high acceptance 
among white male Americans, there is considerable resistance to specific affirmative action programmes {Taylor (1991): p 133]. 
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differs from legal reasoning in not starting with some authoritative text. 10 This difference in ethical 
enquiry and legal reasoning leads one to the question of constitutional lnterpretation.11 One of the 
Interpretive methods12 Is "value arguments• that make claims about justice, morality and/or social 
policy. It has been claimed that value arguments have an accepted role in cases Involving constitutional 
language, such as the equal protection clause, whose meaning is essentially contestable and has a 
valuative component.13 To the extent that value arguments are accepted as permissible, ethical 
arguments may play a significant role In constitutional interpretation. This may be especially apposite 
in cases where it is difficult to apply the other methods of constitutional interpretation, for instance, 
where the text Is general and vague, the intent of the framers difficult to ascertain, constitutional theory 
Indeterminate and no relevant precedents exist. According to Dworkin the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalizes the concept of equality without offering any specific 
conception of it. 14 Rosenfeld argues that likewise the other preconditions for permitting a valid recourse 
to value arguments are present (in the absence of a relevant precedent in a particular case, of course) 
in the equal protection provision.15 Furthermore, in the case of precedents he points out that the judge 
has three competing views18 of equality to choose from, thus once again, leaving ample latitude for 
ethical considerations to inform the judge's choice. 
The conclusion then is that ethical arguments may legitimately be used in the interpretation of an 
equality provision in a Bill of Rights. This conclusion is unremarkable if one remembers that a 
constitution is a value laden document rather than a rule book and hence requires an interpretive 
approach vastly different from the positivistic or literal approach traditionally followed by our courts when 
interpreting ordinary legislation. 
1.4. Individual-based socio-economic model: Throughout this paper reference. is made to an 
"individual-based socio-economic" model of affirmative action, it being offered as a better alternative 
10Rosenfeld M. (1991): Affirmative Action And Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional lnquirvNew Haven: Yale University 
Press: p 137. 
11Fal/on {cited in Rosenfeld (1991): pp 138-139/ identifies five constitutional interpretive methods: the text of the constitution; 
the intent of the framers; arguments of constitutional theory; judicial precedent; and value arguments. 
13Rosenfeld (1991): p 139. 
14Cited in Rosenfeld (1991): p 141. 
15Rosenfeld (1991): pp 141-143. 
16Rosenfeld (1991): pp 141-144. These are: (i) that the Constitution requires co/our-blindness; (ii) that race-conscious 
classifications are justified only when compelling government interests are at stake; and (iii) that there are no limitations against 
using racial preferences aimed at removing the present effects of past discrimination. 
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than group-based programmes. This model rejects group-based modalities of affirmative action and is 
based on the premise that affirmative action's objective is to assist individuals in their pursuit of their 
rational life plans (rather than to promote group Interests, which are served indirectly by assisting 
individuals). Operationalization of the model would entaU identifying indiciae of socio-economic 
deprivation (of which race, gender, etc would be important components) and calculating a compound 
score for individuals. Employers and other dispensers of social goods would be allowed the freedom 
to promote the interests of whomever they prefer, but rewards will be attached to the promotion of the 
disadvantaged in direct proportion to the degree of socio-economic deprivation. This model is 
fundamentally egalitarian but preserves and promotes freedom of choice in the interest of effectiveness 
and productivity. It is further assumed that equality as a constitutional ideal does not find its moral base 
in notions of past discrimination or compensatory justice, nor does it need to be of temporary duration. 
Affirmative action is a distributive justice issue and is necessary simply because our Constitution directs 
us to strive to eradicate inequalities, whatever their causes; but this does not mean that the Constitution 
permits us to employ any means towards that end. It is admitted that the implementation of this model 
presents formidable practical challenges. These, however, can be met, and, if the proposed National 
Educational Framework is taken as a comparator, the individual-based socio-economic model is but an 
extension of the Idea that people should have a right to development and that those who assist them 
in this should be awarded accordingly and appropriately. 
I wish to end this introductory chapter with a general observation on the South African debate on 
affirmative action. It never ceases to amaze me that in the affirmative action debate, South Africans, in 
their search for an appropriate model for South Africa, persist in using the rather dismal history of 
affirmative action in the US as a referent, apparently failing to appreciate the vastly different political and 
demographic situations prevailing in the two countries. The fact that affirmative action is currently facing 
severe headwinds in the US body politic and from the American public in general, does not necessarily 
mean that the same will happen in South Africa. In the US it is the political powerful majority group who 
granted affirmative action benefits to the black minority, and who, by the same token, can take them 
away. In South Africa it is the black majority who can initiate affirmative action legislation in favour o 
their own group and who would, as a matter of practical politics, find it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, once introduced, to withdraw these benefits. It is in such a situation where the drawing of 
the constitutional boundaries of affirmative action is of particular importance to restrain the politically 
powerful from following their natural inclinations to favour their constituency irrespective of the harm this 
may cause to the interests of minority groupings and society as a whole. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~· 
CHAPTER 2: TIE CONCEPT~ 
2.1.· INTRODUCTION 
The concept "equality" has since the earliest of times1 been used in a variety of ways and normally In 
a context that implies that it is a fundamental element of justice. While justice has many manifestations, 
we are concerned with distributive justice2 when analysing the equality provision of a constitution.3 
However, there seems to be little agreement as to what is meant by the concepts of equality and 
justice.4 One of the earliest definitions of justice holds that to treat equals equally and unequals 
differently encapsulates the essence of justice.5 But this simply begs the question since one's system 
of classification of "equals" and "unequals" and the consequences of this classification will determine the 
fairness of the awards and punishment attached to these classifications. For instance, to classify people 
as "black'' or "white" may not be intrinsically reprehensible, but to make the distribution of social goods 
and civil liberties contingent upon the classification may well be grossly unfair. Neither is the prior 
problem addressed by the Aristotelian equation, namely· the problem of relevant classifications that is 
central to the philosophy of equality. 
The incommensurability of the opposing sides in the affirmative action debate is based on fundamental 
disagreements about the meaning of such concepts as "equality" and "justice"; both sides proclaim their 
allegiance to the ideal of equality.6 This traditional liberal-libertarian-socialist debate has been criticized 
by, for instance, the relational feminist movement7 for remaining imbedded in (and thus limited to) a 
(white) male cultural paradigm. The atomistic view of persons as individuals in society can, to my mind, 
justly be attacked from a communitarian perspective as not necessarily the only or the best narrative 
1 From the Stoic philosophers to the Hebraic and Christian idea of equality befol8 God. See Russel B.(1979): History of Westem 
Philosophy London: George Allen & Unwin for an excellent 18view of the diffel8nt historical strands that constitute our 
philosophical tradition. Also Griffith W.B.: •Equality and Egalitarianism: Framing the Contemporary Debate• in Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 5-26. 
2For the purposes of this study •distributive justice• can be defined as those values, criteria and roles used in deciding the 
manner in which social goods should be allocated. 
3rorke J.W.: 'The Judicial Process in Equal Protection Cases· in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Vol. 9, 1982: pp 27~ 
349: p 333. 
4
•Equality is a popular but mysterious political ideal. People can become equal (or at least mol8 equal) in one way with the· 
consequence that they become unequal (or mol8 unequal) in others . .•. It does not follow ... that equality is worthless as an ideal. 
But it is necessary to state, fflOf8 exactly than is commonly done, what form of equality is finally important' {Dworkin R.: What 
is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare• in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 10, No. 3, 1981: pp 185-246: p 185]. 
5This led to the use of the ·similarly situated• test in the US and Canada. See Albertyn C. & Kentridge J.: ·introducing the Right 
to Equality in the Interim Constitution• in South African Journal on Human Rights Vol. 10, Part 2, 1994: pp 14~178: p 153. 
6Rosenfeld M. (1991): Affirmative Action And Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry New Haven: Yale University 
Pl8SS: pp 2-3. 
7KDggel C.M.: •A Feminist V"l9w of Equality and Its Implications for Affirmative Action• in Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 43-59. 
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of social man. 8 Acceptance of competing views of the relationship between individuals and society8 
can have profound implications for our view of such fundamental concepts as property rights, 10 rights 
and duties and equality.11 These topics are, however, so wide-ranging and, since they are not 
amenable to superficial treatment, I shall not attempt to deal with them here, save for giving one 
example. By way of contrast with the orthodox libertarian conception of property rights, the modem 
tendency is towards a restriction of property rights in what has been referred to as the "socialization of 
property".12 Jordaan13 describes this process as follows: "'Socialization' of law entails the adjustment 
of conflicting interests in society through the subordination of the individual's interests to those of 
society at large. In relation to property, it entails a shift away from an individualist 'and basically 
exploitive' perception of property rights towards the notion that property is a social responsibility. The 
underlying premise is that the institution of property is derived from and protected by society, i.e. it is 
a social institution and may be made to serve particular social objectives. This is accomplished through 
'public law' regulation of the use and application of property resources. 'Absolute' rights are replaced 
by rights qualified to suit the needs of society best. ... Legal rules do not exist in a vacuum but are tied 
to the social system within which they operate.• The preceding reasoning can validly be used to justify 
further intrusions into managerial prerogative, for instance, to achieve the goals of affirmative action and 
equality. 
2.2. ANALYSING THE CONCEPT •EQUALITY'" 
The bland assertion that "blacks or women should be treated equally" may be interpreted in a variety 
of ways, depending on what notion of equality the speaker has in mind. In the analysis such a statement 
8Gochnauer M.: "Critical Notice: Myth, Misogyny and Male Neurosis• In Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VI, 
No. 1, January 1993: pp 153-167. 
9See, for instance Andrews J.S.: ·uberal Equality and the Justification of Multicultural, Civic Education• in Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 111-126. 
10see for instance, Mackinnon K.A.B.: "GMng It All Away? Thomas Reid's Retreat from a Natural Rights Justification of Private 
Property" in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VI, No. 2, July 1993: pp 249-285; Waldron J.: •property, Justification 
and Need• in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VI, No. 2, July 1993: pp 185-215; Singer J. W. & Beerman J.M.: 'The 
Social Origins of Property" in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VI, No. 2, July 1993: pp 217-248. 
77See, for instance Koggel C.M.: •A Feminist View of Equality and Its Implications for Afflrmative Action• in Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 43-59; Jacobs LA: •Equal Opportunity and Gender Disadvantage• in 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 61-71; Nzegwu N.: "Gender Equality in a Dual-Sex 
System: the Case of On1tsha• in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 73-95. 
12 Jordaan in Rycroft A & Jordaan B. (1992): A Guide to South African Labour Law Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd. (Second Edition): 
p 15. 
131bid: pp 16 - 17. 
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the following questions need clarification14: 
(i) For whom is the assertion of inequality /equality to hold (the "subject of equality")? 
(ii) With respect to what is equality being claimed (the "domain of equality")? 
(iii) Is an equal distribution of some social goods or an equal distribution of an opportunity 
to acquire those goods, being claimed ("equality of opportunity or means•)? 
(iv) By what standards are the assertion of inequality/equality asserted (the "metric of 
equality"15)? 
Returning to the statement •blacks and women must be treated equally-, we can see, in the light of the 
above four questions, that it is such a vacuous statement that none of egalitarians, liberals, or 
libertarians 16 will have a problem in endorsing It. The real focus of disagreement will be uncovered 
when liberals and libertarians are asked to reach agreement on each of the above questions. 
2.2.1. The subject of equality: As I shall be returning to this question when discussing section 8 of the 
Constitution, I am not dealing with this question in any detail, save to say that the assumption that 
equality enhancing interventions should be founded upon a group-based notion of affirmative action is 
fallacious. It may well be argued that these notions of affirmative action are unconstitutional if compared 
to a more narrowly tailored means such as an individual-based socio-economic model of affirmative 
action.17 
2.2.2. The object/domain of equality: In this section it will be argued that the proper question is not 
"why equality?. or "equality versus egalitarianism", 18 but "equality of what?". All normative theories of 
the "just society" that have stood the test of time have one characteristic in common, namely that they 
14These analytical questions have been formulated by, among others Griffith and Sen. The subsequent discussion in the text 
is heavily indebted to these two authors. [See Griffith W.B.: 'Equality and Egalitarianism: Framing the Contemporary Debate• in 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1994: pp 5-26; and Sen A (1992): lnequalitv Reexamined New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc: p ix.] 
115This term is borrowed from Dworkin. See his series of articles on equality. [Dworkin R.: What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality 
of Welfare" In Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 10, No. 3, 1981: pp 185-246; Dworkin R.: What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Resources• in Philosophv and Public Affairs Vol. 10, No. 4, 1981: pp 28~345; Dworkin R.: What is Equality? Part 3: The Place 
of Liberty" in Iowa Law Review Vol. 73, 1987: pp 1-54.] 
161 do not put forward definitions of these terms, but the following should give a sense of what I mean by them: an 'egalitarian 
view' could be associated with some form of socialism which holds that equality in some material respect is desirable (e.g. 
welfare or income, hence "welfare egalitarians• and 'income ega/itariansj; a 'libertarian view' would subscribe to the pre-eminence 
of the individual and the inviolability of individual rights and the minimal state (Nozick is the obvious example); a 'liberal view' 
could be associated with 'social market' economies and legal philosophers such as Rawls (it is roughly the view that individual 
and communitarian considerations should both be considered). 
17See Chapter 1. 
18Since all enduring theories of social justice are 'egalitarian", as explained in the text infra. 
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demand equality of •something", 19 that something being central to a particular theory.20 Utilitarians 
demand equal weights on the utilities of all, libertarians insist on equal enjoyment of civil rights and 
liberties for all, income and welfare egalitarians regard equal incomes and equal welfare levels, 
respectively, as indispensable for the just society. Therefore, to characterise the controversy over 
equality as one involving those who are against equality versus those who are for equality is • ... to miss 
something central to the subject. 1121 For instance, a libertarian would have no objection in principle to 
equal incomes given a certain set of prevailing circumstances and provided that equal enjoyment of 
individual rights and liberties is not compromised. Insisting on equality in respect of a particular variable 
that is central to a given theory of social justice of necessity entails tolerating inequalities in competing 
variables. For instance, a libertarian cannot demand equal enjoyment of rights and liberties and insist 
on the pre-eminence of the merit principle and at the same time insist on equality of income levels. The 
dispute between egalitarians and libertarians in truth therefore resides not in the concept of equality but 
in identifying the central social variable that should be given priority over competing socially desirable 
arrangements. Human diversity will inevitably cause that equality in one respect will give rise to inequality 
in another.22 Ethical theories typically try to justify inequalities in the peripheral variables by pointing 
to equality in the focal variable which it is proposed is the most important equality in terms of a particular 
ethical theory.23 The question is therefore: what focal variable is central to section 8 of our 
Constitution? 
2.2.3. Equality of opportunity or equality of means: In this section two broad issues are addressed, 
namely, the meaning of the much used phrase "equality of opportuntty and human diversity in capacity 
to achieve versus equality in freedom to achieve. Before turning to the main topics of this section some 
brief comments on the relationship between equality and freedom are apposite. 
19 John Rawls jequal liberty" and equality in the distribution of •pr;mary goods?; Ronald Dworkin ("tleatment as equals• and 
•equality of resources?; Thomas Nagel jeconomic equality?; Robert Nozick (extensive liberties •equally guaranteed to each?. 
2
°rhe ubiquity of •egalitarianism• in all social theories can be explained by the fact that a theol)', in order to endure, must 
possess some ethical plausibility. This is difficult to obtain unless ewl)IOne is given equal consideration in respect of something. 
21Sen A. {1992): lnequalffv Reexamined New York: Oxford University Press Inc: pix. 
22
'The differences In focus are particularly important because of extensiw human diversity. Had all people been exactly similar, 
equality in one space (e.g. incomes) would tend to be congruent with equalities in others (e.g. health, we/I-being, happiness). 
One of the consequences of 'human diwrsity' is that equality in one space tends to go, in fact, with inequality in another' {!bid: 
p20). 
23
·1ndeed, it is equality in that more important space that may then be seen as contributing to the contingent demands for 
inequality in the other spaces. The justification of inequality in some features is made to rest on the equality of some other feature, 
taken to be more basic in that ethical system. Equality in what is seen as the 'base' is invoked for a reasoned defence of the 
resulting inequalities In the far-flung 'peripheries"' [Sen (1992): p 19]. And •(t)he answer we give to 'equality of what?' will not only 
endorse equality in that chosen space {the focal variable being related to the demands of basal equality), but will haw far-reaching 
consequences on the distributional patterns (including necessary inequalities) in the other spaces. 'Equality of what?' is indeed 
a momentous - and central question• [Sen (1992): p 21]. 
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Equality versus liberty: Equality and liberty are often presented as mutually exclusive ends, or at least 
as sharing an Inverse relationship. Libertarians such as Nozick are seen as anti-egalitarian primarily 
because of the priority they attach to liberty. This way of viewing the relationship between liberty and 
equalty is erroneous since It is based on a category mistake since "(l)iberty is among the possible fields 
of application of equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty . ... the 
need to face explicitly the choice of space is an inescapable part of the specification and reasoned 
evaluation of the demands of equality. There are, at one end, demands of equal libertarian rights only, 
and at the other end, various exacting demands of equality regarding an extensive list of achievements 
and also a co"esponding list of freedoms to achieve. 1124 Equality and liberty need not be mutually 
exclusive, although there will frequently be a tension between them, depending on the means employed 
to promote these two values. 
"Equality of opportunities": Equality of opportunity is one of the touchstones of distributive justice (and 
hence the need for anti-discrimination laws to restore this state of equal opportunities, as a first step 
towards equality). Since opponents of affirmative action enlist the equal opportunity principle to support 
their opposition25 as well as proponents to bolster their arguments26, It is necessary to analyse this 
concept in greater detail.27 The concept of "opportunity" implies a freedom to do or participate in 
something; freedom in turn implies the absence of obstacles or restrictions. In order to distinguish 
between freedom and opportunity, something more than the absence of obstacles or restrictions is 
necessary, otherwise "opportunity" and "freedom" would be synonymous. The additional element that 
distinguishes "opportunity" from "freedom" is the fact that the person presented with an opportunity must 
exert a choice as well as invest some effort in order to make use of the opportunity.28 These active 
elements of the concept of "opportunity" also distinguish It from "chance" in that the latter implies that 
there is a certain probability of the person obtaining some reward or not, irrespective of his own 
exertions. The concept of equal opportunity can now be defined as follows:29 The opportunities of 
persons X and Y are equal in respect of some goal, A, if they face the same obstacles in attaining A. 
From this definition It is clear that two things need to be equalized, that is "opportunities" and 
"obstacles". Supposing that we place a duty on society to provide equality of opportunity, the following 
241bid: pp 22-23. 
25 Affirmative action amounts to favouritism, nwerse discrimination, and as such is subversive of the equal opportunity principle. 
26Preferential measures are necessary to achieve true equality of opportunity. 
27This analysis is based on Fullinwider [Ful/inwider R.K. (1980): The Reverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral And Legal 
Analysis Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman And Littlefield: pp 97-109]. 
28
"Although opportunity arises when some obstacles to achievement are removed, other obstacles, needing effort to overcome 
them, will still remain. Opportunities can be grasped or let pass, seized or squandered. The agent must decide. It is an essential 
part of something's being called an opportunity that both an agenrs choices and efforts are called for' [Fullinwider (1980): p 97]. 
29Fu/linwider {1980): p 97. 
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questions arise: 0) equalize opportunies in respect of what goals?; and (ii) equalize in respect of what 
obstacles? It is clear that it would be unattainable and unreasonable to expect society to equalize all 
goals for every individual, given the unique and different attributes of people. SimUar problems present 
themselves when we turn to the equalization of obstacles: not all obstacles can be equalized, nor can 
a duty be placed on the community to equalize.30 A further problem with the equaliziation of obstacles 
is how to determine when an obstacle can be regarded as equal. Does it mean that the task (that is, 
the obstacle to be overcome) should be the same or that a similar amount of effort should be required 
from both individuals?31 It seems as if the notion of equality of opportunitf2 is too open to conflicting 
interpretations to serve without more ado as a basis for distributive justice.33 
Human diversity in capacity to achieve versus equality in freedom to achieve: The equality debate 
can be analysed in terms of two types of diversities: (i) the innate diversity of human beings;34 and (ii) 
the multiplicity of variables in respect of which equality can be demanded. In the preceding discussion 
I reviewed some of the variables involved in the latter question. I now turn to human diversity. A person's 
position in society can be evaluated from two different perspectives, namely (i) his freedom to achieve, 
and (ii) his actual achievement. Likewise, inequality can be evaluated in terms of actual achievement or 
the real opportunity (freedom) to achieve. These two variables need not be congruent since people's 
ability to convert a freedom into actual achievement will vary depending on their innate abilities, 
dispositions, et cetera. In evaluating the social justice of a particular community it will therefore make 
a great difference whether we distinguish between achievement and freedom when applying the equality 
criterion. Some social theories, such as utilitarianism, focus exclusively on achievement while affording 
freedom only an instrumental value. The exclusive focus on achievement has recently been challenged 
by a shift of focus towards the means to achievement rather on achievement as such. 35 Since the 
degree of freedom a person enjoys is a function of the means at his disposal, the shift from evaluating 
30For example, a person brought up in a household in which achievement and qualifteations a/8 highly prized may have an 
advantage over someone brought up by pa18nts who did not inculcate these norms. Can society be expected to provide a 
surrogate, for the parental support the former would recieve from his family, for the latter person? It has been argued that Raw/s's 
theory requims the abolition of the family as a social institution to attain gmater equality of opportunity. 
31The latter interpmtation may, for instance, entail that society must provide a disabled person with the means to compete 
with an able-bodied person without the former having to exert any mom effort than the latter. 
32Ful/inwider (1980: pp 101-109) discusses two forms of equality of opportunity, which he calls "formal equality of opportunity" 
(FEO) and •tibera/ equality of opportunity" (LEO). He defines FEO as: "X and Y have equal opportunity in mgard to jobs so long 
as neither faces a legal or quasi-legal barrier to employment the other does not face.· (ibid: p 101) And LEO as: "X and Y have 
equal employment opportunities when neither faces a total package of educational, legal, and market barriers which is distinctly 
gnJater than the package faced by the othe,. (ibid: p 108). 
33The principle can be interpmted to permit, forbid or requim pmfemntial hiring. 
34The importance that Sen (1992) places on the mality of human diversity is a recurring theme in his work. 
35Sen (1992): p 33. Examples aJ8 the Rawlsian concem with the distribution of •primary goods· and the Dworkin/an focus on 
the distribution of ·msouices•. 
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a person's social position in terms of actual achievement towards his command over resources, entails 
a shift from achievement to the means of freedom. 38 Freedom must therefore not be confused with the 
means to freedom since there exists great diversity in people's ability to convert primary goods or 
resources into achievements. 37 From this It follows that •... comparisons of resources and primary 
goods cannot serve as the basis for comparing freedoms. 1138'39 
2.2.4. The metric of equality: The measurement of equality must pose some of the most daunting tasks 
for anyone trying to formulate a coherent theory of affirmative action. The fact of vast inequalities in our 
society cannot be disputed, but how to quantify these disparities in a way consistent with theory is a 
difficult problem. On a practical level one could simply take figures from the government's Department 
of Central Statistical Services and the annual report of the Department of Labour and infer from these 
that there are inter-group differences based on gender or race. Apart from the problem that at present 
these sources of statistical information do not cover all the protected categories mentioned in section 
8 of our Constitution40, there is a much more serious objection to this approach. In general terms this 
objection relates to peoples' differential ability to convert freedoms and means into well-being as well 
as the influence of cultural differences on peoples' life choices (discussed in the previous section). From 
a theoretical viewpoint, the statistical approach will not reflect people's differential capacity to achieve 
and will thus not flt very well with a conception of equality based on equality of welfare.41 
The importance of cultural diversity and its effects on life choices, such as the selection of a career, are 
sometimes scoffed at or downplayed by lawyers.42 Why this is so Is not difficult to understand. Once 
one has constructed a neat theory in terms of which the differences between groups are explained by 
361bid: pp 36-37. 
37
*Equality of freedom to pursue our ends cannot be generated by equality in the distribution of primary goods. We have to 
examine interpersonal variations in the transformation of primary goods (and resources, more generally) into respective 
capabilities to pursue our ends and objectives. If our concern is with equality of freedom, it is no more adequate to ask for equality 
of its means than it is to seek equality of its results. Freedom relates to both, but does not coincide with either* (Sen (1992): p 
87). 
381bid: p 38. 
39
"Resources are important for freedom, and income is crucial for avoiding poverty. But if our concern is ultimately with 
freedom, we cannot- given human diversity- treat resources as the same thing as freedom. Similarly, if our concern is with the 
failure of cettain minimal capabilities because of lack of economic means, we cannot identify poverty simply as low income, 
dissociated from the interpersonally variable connection between income and capability. It is in terms of capability that the 
adequacy of particular income levels has to be judged" (!bid: p 112). 
~he categories listed in s 8(2) are ·race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture or language•. 
'
41Dworkin R.: What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare" in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 10, No. 3, 1981: pp 185-246. 
42See for instance Smith (1995). 
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one variable only, namely unfair discrimination,43 then it would not do to allow for a nuisance variable 
such as culture to confuse the measurement of equality /inequality. Ignorance of the profound and 
enduring effects that cultural variables have on people's abUity to compete successfully for jobs and 
educational opportunities (or to downplay Its importance by saying that culturally determined values are 
easily changed44) do not, however, refute the empirical evidence in contradiction to this. 415 Just to 
name a few examples of instances where the facts confuse (and are therefore rejected by people such 
as Fiscus and Smith) the neat discrimination-as-only-explanatory-variable hypothesis: Afrikaners had, 
after eighty years of vigorous, government driven affirmative action not reached economic parity with 
English-speaking South Africans although they were a relatively small group who could suppress the 
blacks and exploit the country's resources and large industries.46 Should one use Fiscus' theorem and 
compare the Afrikaner group with their English compatriots as a group, one would have to reach the 
conclusion that the Afrikaners were discriminated against over the past eighty years! In a study of the 
persistence of skill, educational and income differentials over generations of immigrants to the US the 
conclusion was reached that • ... ethnicity matters, and it matters for a vety long time. 947 A last example 
can be extracted from the phenomenon that Jews, irrespective of their country of residence, tend to 
overachieve relative to their proportion of the total population of their host country.48 1 am by no means 
trying to assert that socio-economic factors do not play a determinative role in achievement or to 
introduce a race superiority theory by the back door into the debate. As far as race as determinant of 
cognitive abilities is concerned, there is no scientific proof of this. 49 That a group's socio-economic 
status can and will influence scores on general intelligence tests are well documented. For instance, 
Afrikaner school children as a group used to score consistently and significantly lower on intelligence 
tests than their English counterparts. To infer an inherent inferiority from this would have been 
erroneous: this difference in scores has been obliterated by the Afrikaners' subsequent socio-economic 
43This is the central thesis of Fiscus [Fiscus R.J. (1992): The Constitutional Loaic of Affirmative Action London: Duke University 
Press]. 
44As Smith does {(1995): p 100]. 
45The fact that lawyers B/8 not trained in the scientific method common to the harr:J sciences is also a major contributing 
factor. A natural scientist will start from discreet observations from which he will deduce hypotheses to be subjected to empirical 
verification and application to new phenomenon (the so-called deducmt.hypothetico-inductive method). To come to the truth 
through pure reason rather than by way of empirical observation would strike the natural scientist as strange indeed. 
46See Peron J. (1992): Affirmative Action. Apartheid and Caeita/ism. FMF Paper 119: Johannesburg. 
47 Borjas G.J.: "Long-run Convergence of Ethnic Skill Differentials: The Children and Grandchildren of the Great Migration• in 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol. 47, No. 4, July 1994: pp 553-573: p 572. Borjas concludes that it might take four 
generations, or roughly 100 }'&ars, for these differentials to disappear (op cit). 
48Williams points out that Jews, who only constitute 2 % of Americans, account for 25% of winners of Nobel prizes. Williams 
provides the following further examples: American blacks constitute 12% of the population, but represent 75% of professional 
basketball, 60% of professional football and 17% of professional baseball pla}'&rs [Williams W.E.: "False CM/ Rights Vision and 
Contempt for Rule of Law" in The Geon;zetown Law Journal Vol. 79, 1991: pp 1777-1782: p 1778]. 
49/n general, see Block N. & Dworkin G. (Eds) (1977): The IQ Controversy London: Quarted Books. 
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upliftment. The point is that ethnicitt° is of significant practical importance when making inter-group 
comparisons. This is in addition to discrimination, and not in refutation of the discrimination hypothesis 
to account for inter-group differentials. 
Returning to the question of achieving and measuring equality I wish to point to another reason why this 
is of more than practical importance, and indeed goes to the heart of the moral justification of affirmative 
action perceived as a remedial measure for past societal wrongs. It is of some importance that all South 
African writers51 feel compelled at some stage to mention that affirmative action is of a temporary 
nature only. The reason for this is straightforward: if one wishes to justify affirmative action as a means 
to rectify a wrong, the rationale for the preferential intervention should logically come to an end at some 
time in the future, even if it is 100 years hence. 52 I do not see affirmative action as merely a temporary 
remedy. Properly viewed it should be seen as an ongoing corrective for society's tendency to 
discriminate against non-dominant groups. 53 Politicians also find it useful to sell affirmative action to 
the majority on the basis that it is a temporary remedial device for past injustices. But is this true or do 
such programmes have a natural tendency to become permanent?54 Opponents of affirmative action 
cite India, Malaysia and Pakistan as instances where preferential programmes with legally mandated cut-
off dates have continued far past those dates by subsequent extensions. 55 Even supporters of 
affirmative action concede that privileges once enjoyed are not easily removed, even in situations where 
the political majority has conferred these privileges and in theory can withdraw them: as is the case in 
America, political exigencies militate against this. 56 Also, because of the different ways in which 
inequality can be measured and the different types of equalities present in society it is doubtful whether 
. the ideal state of equality will ever be achieved,57 or, for that matter, will be recognized, if achieved 
50 And the concomitant cultural values identffied with a specific group. 
510r at least, I have not come across anyone questioning the temporary nature of affirmative action (I may be wrong in this). 
52Borjas {(1994): p 572/: concludes that it might take four generations, or roughly 100 years, for these differentials to 
disappear. I do not share this optimistic time schedule of the expiry date of affirmative action in South Africa. 
53See the discussion in the text. Also see the discussion of •atomized and generalized conceptions of discrimination• under 
Section 3.5.1. infra. 
54
•Affirmafive action policies often addressed the needs of the aspiring middle classes to the neglect of policies and 
programmes aimed at the needs of the lower social classes• {Weiner M.: •Affirmative Action: The lntemational Experience• in 
Urban Foundation Publication: Development and Democracy 4 May 1993: pp 1-15: p 12/. 
55Peron J. (1992): Affirmative Action. Apartheid and Capitalism. FMF Paper #9: Johannesburg: p 4. 
56S/oot (1986): pp 284-285; Fullinwider (1980): pp 248-249. Also see Thompson's discussion of affirmative action in Malaysia 
and India. [Thompson C.: •Legislating Affirmative Action: Employment Equity And Lessons From Developed And Developing 
Countries· in Adams C. (Ed) (1993): Affirmative Action in a Democratic South Africa Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: pp 21-46/. 
577he need to admit incompleteness in inequality evaluation is inescapable, and there is much to be said for addressing that 
question explicitly rather than in grudgingly implicit ways ... Babbling is not, in general, superior to being silent on matters that 
are genuinely unclear or undecided ... Those who see equality as a clear, articulate, and decisive arbitr.dor of every social or 
political dispute would find this position particularly unattractive• [Sen (1992): p 134/. 
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(thereby also pointing to the logic of admitting the permanency of affirmative action). 
2.2.5. The limits of the pursuit of equality of outcome: The question may be asked whether it is true 
that, if it is axiomatic that in a straight conflict between freedom and equality, freedom must lose (as 
Dworkin asserts58) and considering the overriding importance our Constitution confers on equality, that 
any means to equality will be constitutional? The answer to this question must be an emphatic •no•. We 
may be able to ascertain the broad contours of the limits placed on the pursuit of equality by way of 
a few examples. It has been said that true equality will only be obtained if the social institution of the 
family were to be abolished.s Assuming a statute is adopted abolishing the institution of the family and 
mandating that all children must be raised by a government agency, in the name of equality, would such 
a statute pass constitutional review? It seems highly unlikely, given the importance placed on the familiy 
and the family group in our society, despite the statute's laudable aim and Its presumed effectiveness 
in achieving its objective. Likewise a statute reserving more than a proportionate share of jobs for blacks 
or totally barring whites from partaking of certain social goods, even if only for a specified limited period, 
would not likely be regarded as constitutional, regardless of its effectiveness in achieving the objectives 
of a more egalitarian society.60 To my mind the most satisfactory way of measuring inequality would 
be to move away from the group-based notion and rather to focus on individual socio-economic 
indicators of disadvantage (one or more of which will be race and gender, in recognition of the fact that 
there has been great discrimination against blacks and women - but not against all blacks and all 
women). This is of course not to say that a composite model of individual disadvantage will not have 
to face up to the same practical and theoretical problems encountered in the group-based approach to 
equality and affirmative action. But at least this individualized approach will bring us nearer to the 
measurement of those variables that are of importance in relation to the object of affirmative action: we 
do not want to uplift groups in the abstract, we want to come to the assistance of flesh and blood 
individuals who happen to be members of groups and as a consequence of the aggregate advancement 
of individuals of the group the group itself would as a whole be better off. But the latter consequence 
to the group is merely incidental to the real objective of affirmative action, that is the improvement of 
actual individuals' life circumstances and prospects. 
58See Dworkin R.: What is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty" in Iowa Law Review Vol. 73, 1987: pp 1-54 ["Any genuine 
contest between liberty and equality is a contest liberty must lose" (p 7)]. Also Fakile Barn's contention that our present 
Constitution • ... gives priority to equality owr freedom• {Laurence P.: "'Equality before freedom•in The Star 6 October 1994]. 
59See, for instance, the references to Rawls' theory of justice in Duff D.G.: 7axing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument" 
in Canadian Joumal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VI, No. 1, January 1993: pp 3-62. 
60Smith (1995) provides the example of a statute prohibiting uniwrsities from admitting whites for a period of fifteen years in 
order to address the Imbalances in education and job oppottunities currently prevailing between whites and blacks. Given the 
limited resources available for tertiary education and the inadvisability of appointing and promoting unqualified blacks, such a 
statute would make sense (from a purely effectiveness or instrumentality point of view), but it would, to my mind be 
unconstitutional because it would employ rewrse discrimination in pursuit of a legitimate objective. 
CHAPTER 3: CONS11TU110NAL EQUALITY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Most, if not all, constitutions seek to protect and promote equality and liberty as their guiding 
principles. 1 Numerous reasons can be offered for the pre-eminence of these values in constitutions, but 
in general one could say that the presence of liberty and equality in a society improves the ability of its 
members to pursue their diverse ends2 or conceptions of the good. 3 It has been claimed that the 
difference between a liberal democratic state and an illiberal state is that the latter prescribes a 
conception of the good whereas the former promotes none. 4 Especially in a culturally diverse society 
like ours it is important that the government be not too closely associated with a particular conception 
of the good, since this will lead to the government being identified with a particular segment of society 
thereby alienating other segments that hold a different conception of the good. The danger of 
government partiality In this respect lies in the potential that it may progress into coercive measures5 
to impose its values and ideals on others. This tendency to autocracy is premised on the assumption 
that, should the government not be neutral regarding the plurality of diverse values and the conceptions 
of the good prevalent in society, its bias could generate intolerance. 6 
Given the historical contex:t7 in which our Constitution came into being, it is not surprising that our 
1Davis D.: "Equality and Equal Protection" in Van Wyk D., Dugard J., De Villiers B. & Davis D. (Eds) {1994): Rights and 
Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: pp 196-211: p 196. 
2The freedom to choose one's ends and the means to achieve these do of course not imply that in a democracy based on 
freedom and equality the state is prohibited from placing reasonable limits on the individual's freedom of choice. In this regard 
see Cohen-Almagor R.: "Between Neutrality and Perfectionism• in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 2, July 
1994: pp 217-236. 
3Liberal philosophers view the aim of a just state as to further liberty and certain egalitarian values [John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin ant two we/I-known examples]. 
4Cohen-Almagor R.: "Between Neutrality and Perfectionism• in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. VII, No. 2, July 
1994: pp 217-236. 
5The best-known prophet of the slide from welfate state intervention to totalitarianism is of course Hayek {see, Hayek FA 
{1960): The Constitution of Libertv London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.; Hayek FA {1982): Law. Legislation and Libenv: A new 
statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.: Volume 2: "The Mirage 
of Social Justice"; also his much celebrated book The Road to Serfdom published in 1945]. 
6The endemic nature of political intolerance in present day South Africa needs no substantiation {the internecine violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal; the inability of traditionally white political parties to campaign in black townships, et cetera). John Rawls describes 
the problem faced by political liberalism thus: "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free 
and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?• [Rawls J. {1993): Political 
Liberalism New York: Columbia University Press: p xxv]. In Political Liberalism Rawls calls this a problem of"political justice• and 
offers a solution to this liberal conundrum. 
77he equal treatment clause is of patticu/ar importance in South Africa where the previous constitutional system rested upon 
the foundation of discrimination based upon race. This racial discrimination permeated throughout society and was so thoroughly 
reprehensible that it to a certain extent masked other forms of discrimination (especially against women) which were also 
prevalent in society" [Sasson D. (1994): South Africa's Interim Constitution Text and Notes Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: p 22]. 
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Constitution8 exhibits the same general trend in giving pride of place to equality. Not only does the first 
fundamental right enumerated in Chapter 3 of the Constitution deal with "equality", 9 but also the first, 
second, third and fifth "Constitutional Principles" contain provisions relating to equality and freedom. 10 
However, "equality" Is such an elusive concept that an excursion into the possible meanings of the term 
Is necessary before proceeding with the interpretation of the equality provision in our Constitution. 
Previously11 it was concluded that under certain circumstances ethical and philosophical arguments 
may legitimately be employed in constitutional interpretation provided that the interpretive discourse can 
be placed within the parameters set by the Constitution. Since affirmative action deals with different 
precepts of equality, which in tum are based on some pre-legal intuition of fairness, the equality and 
affirmative action provisions of the Constitution seem to be pre-eminently suited for this sort of 
interpretive endeavour. This is even more so if the realities in other jurisdictions are taken into account 
where value judgements, although hidden by technical legal jargon, more often than not form the true 
foundation of constitutional interpretation.12 This does not mean, however, that constitutional judges 
possess unbounded licence to interpret a constitution in whichever way their subjective value systems 
may lead them. If we subscribe to some theory of institutional limitation on the Constitutional Court, we 
must accept that properly conceived, the choice between theories of equality and justice is one that 
should be determined in the political sphere, whether legislative or constitutional. We indeed do not have 
a •bevy of platonic guardians but judges over our Constitution (who) ... want restricted tasks. "13 With 
this caveat in mind, the approach adopted in the subsequent discussions can be described as a fusion 
of moral and jurisprudential reasoning. 
8Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
9Section 8 of Act 200 of 1993. 
10 Also see the preamble to the Constitution which reads in part as follows: WHEREAS there is a need to create a new order 
in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional 
state in which there is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and 
exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms•. Also the •atteramble's• vision of a society built on • ... a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.• That the constitutional drafters were we// aware of the fine balance that will have 
to be followed between transformation and social stability is clear from the afteramble: "The pursuit of national unity, the well-being 
of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society. 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife 
of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts 
and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding 
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation.• From this one may 
infer that transformational strategies such as affirmative action should not amount to vengeance, retaliation or victimisation. 
11See Chapter 1. 
120n an observation regarding the US Supreme Court's decisions invoMng the Fourteenth Amendment and the role of value 
calls, see Torke J.W.: "The Judicial Process in Equal Protection Cases .. in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Vol. 9, 1982: pp 
279-349. 
13Torke J.W.: "The Judicial Process in Equal Protection Cases• in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Vol. 9, 1982: pp 279-
349: p 334. 
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This discussion of equality in our Constitution is limited to the equality provisions contained In section 
8 of Act 200 of 1993. Section 8 reads as follows: 
·a. Equalily.-
(1) Evert person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law. 
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the generality 
of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. 
(3)(a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of 
persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
(b) Evert person or community dispossessed of rights In land before the commencement of this Constitution under any 
Jaw which would haw been inconsistent with subsection (2) had that subsection been in operation at the time of the 
dispossession, shall be entftled to claim restitution of such rights subject to and in accordance with sections 121, 122 
and 123. 14 
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be presumed to be 
sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established.• 
3.2. THE •EQUALITY CLAUSE• [S 8(1)] 
The formulation of section 8(1) seems to be in line with the wording found in many constitutions15 in 
guaranteeing the right to equal protection of the law. This section can be regarded as the typical 
embodiment of equality as a fundamental value that must be upheld. Traditionally one could regard the 
object of section 8(1) as guaranteeing formal equality for. all. Davis 16, however, argues that section 8(1) 
can be broadly interpreted to include within its ambit not just formal equality but also substantive 
equality (i.e. as not only prohibiting discrimination but also allowing for affirmative action17). He bases 
his argument on section 232(4) read together with Constitutional Principle V18 of the Constitution. 
Section 232(4) provides that "(i)n interpreting this Constitution a provision in any Schedule, including 
the provision under the heading "National Unity and Reconciliation•, to this Constitution shall not by 
reason only of the fact that it is contained in a Schedule, have a lesser status than any other provision 
of this Constitution which is not contained in a Schedule, and such provision shall for all purposes be 
deemed to form part of the substance of this Constitution.• Constitutional Principle V enjoins the legal 
system to • ... ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process. Equality before 
the law includes laws, programmes or activities that have as their object the amelioration of the 
14Section 8(3)(b) is not discussed. 
15Most notably the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. 
16Davis (1994): pp 207-208. 
171 am not here dealing with s 8(3) which explicitly authorises affirmative action and does not appear to regard it as a deviation 
from equality. 
18Contained in Schedule 4 to the Constitution. 
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conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race, colour or 
gender. -1& This broad interpretation of section 8(1) would render section 8(3) superfluous and thus in 
conflict with the well-known canon of Interpretation that every provision in a statute must be given 
meaning. Davis overcomes this objection by proposin_g that the phrase •disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination• in section 8(3) indicates a function for section 8(3) which is distinct from the objective 
served by section 8(1). In short, Davis seems to say that whereas section 8(1) can be used to justify 
affirmative action to promote substantive equality without a showing of prior discrimination, the ill which 
section 8(3) seeks to remedy is the harm suffered by persons or groups who were the victims of unfair 
discrimination, which remedies are, according to him • ... placed beyond constitutional scrutiny. IQ() This 
latter assertion cannot be correct. Surely Davis cannot contend that once a person or a group has 
shown that it was the victim of unfair discrimination any measure to remedy this injustice must pass 
constitutional muster irrespective of its effects on others? A literal interpretation of Davis's words must 
lead to this conclusion because he also argues that the ambit and operation of section 8(3) should only 
be limited by interpreting what constitutes •unfair discrimination• without recourse to the general 
limitation clause, contained in section 33(1).21 
If this understanding of Davis' argument is correct, he asserts that the combined effect of sections 8(1) 
and 8(3) would be that: (i) the legislature must endeavour to promote formal as well as substantive 
equality irrespective of the causes thereot22 Oeaving aside for the moment the problems attached to 
the meaning of •equali~); (Ii) if it can be shown that •persons or groups or categories of persons 
were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination•, affirmative action measures may be implemented in order 
to •enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms•, which measures will be immune 
19 Also see Constitutional Principle I ("The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign 
state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achillving equality between men 
and women and people of all races'; Constitutional Principle II jEveryone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, 
freedoms and civil Ii/Jetties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, 
which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of this 
Constitution'; and Constitutional Principle Ill ("The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination 
and shall promote racial and gender equality and national un~. 
20Davis (1994): p 208. 
21Davis (1994): pp 208-209. 
22This result is obtained by an expansive interpretation of the meaning ofthe word •equality' ins 8(1) based on s 232(4) and 
Constitutional Principle V of Schedule 4 to the Constitution. ("Section 232(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
provides that in the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution the provisions of the schedules to the Constitution and the 
'afteramble' are to be regarded as of similar weight to the substantive provisions. It is thus open for a South African court to treat 
these parts of the Constitution in the same way as the Indian court has used the Directive Principles ... • and • .•• the Indian 
Supreme Court has exhibited a commitment to an egalitarian society and has sought authority for this approach in the Directives 
Principles of State Policy ... 'equality must not remain a mere idle incantation but must become a living reality forthe large masses 
of people'" (Davis (1994): p 204).] 
23See Chapter 2 supra. 
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from constitutional scrutiny24 ; and (iii) presumably, legislative interventions to promote the egalitarian 
ideal in terms of section 8(1) will be subject to the general limitation clause,25 whereas affirmative action 
measures in terms of section 8(3) will only be limited by the qualifications implicit in the words "designed 
to achieve· and •unfair discrimination• contained in section 8(3). Both these latter phrases warrant further 
scrutiny. 
3.3. THE •ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE• [S 8(2)] 
The word •untair- is used to qualify the word "discrimination• to distinguish between the pejorative and 
the benign meanings of the word.28 Therefore the qualification makes it clear that it is not differentiation 
as such that is prohibited but invidious differentlation.27 Secondly, section 8(2) provides for direct as 
well as indirect measures of discrimination to be proscribed. Thirdly, the phrase "without derogating from 
the generality of this provision" ensures that the list in section 8(2) remains open within certain limits.28 
Fourthly, it is submitted that, irrespective of the uncertainty whether the Constitution has only vertical, 
or vertical as well as horizontal, application29, the question whether discrimination between private 
individuals will be permissible is of little practical importance30 since ordinary legislation31 will guard 
against privatising apartheid and such legislation will be protected against a Constitutional attack by 
24Davis (1994): pp 207 and 209. 
26Section 33 of Act 200 of 1993. 
26 Also see Section 3.4.2. infra. 
27Cheadle {1994): p 103. 
28Cheadle {1994): 7his does not, however, amount to an invitation to admit any ground or classification .... the list of grounds 
reveals a distinct strand. They are all human traits. They are all either immutable characteristics or inherent features of the human 
personality. The unstated classifications contemplated by the clause ought to be limited to analogous classifications. They are 
all classifications that have been used to make invidious distinctions between human beings for the benefit of one group at the 
expense of another" (at pp 104-105). Also see Cachalia et al (1994): pp 24-32. But for a contrary view, see Albertyn & Kentridge 
(1994): pp 149-178. 
29 A discussion of this issue falls beyond the scope of this research. I may note that I am of the opinion that Drittwirkung will 
enable Chapter 3 to have a profound effect on the way our courts will interpret open-ended requirements such as "boni mores• 
in the law of contract and •unfair labour practice" in labour law. Many authors have already commented on the ambiguity of the 
Constitution in this respect; for example, see Dion Basson 's book in this regard (/am in broad agreement with the author except 
that he does not seem to appreciate the difference between the d'nct horizontal operation and the inQUBCt horizontal operation -
- Drittwirkung- of a Constitution) {Basson D. (1994): South Africa's Interim Constitution Text and Notes Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: 
PP~m . 
301 am assuming that we shall see a comprehensive legislative programme in the near future and I am also side-stepping 
those cases that will inevitably fall outside the statutory web. 
31That this is already happening is clear from recent legislation such as the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, Act 153 
of 1993 and the Labour Relations Act of 1995. Likewise in the US, Title Vil of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the private sphere 
equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. It is of course true that there is not perfect equivalence, but the 
issue of Drittwirkung falls beyond the purview of this research and will not be pursued any further. 
I 
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virtue of section 33(4). 32 Furthermore, should the question of private discrimination come before the 
courts, it may well be that, for example, when interpreting a contract which discriminates unfairly, the 
courts will interprer3 the boni mores requirement for the validity of a contract in such a way that a 
contract that in its operation flagrantly disregards the values espoused In Chapter 3 of the Constitution, 
will be declared Invalid for this reason. 34 
In the context of affirmative action litigation, section 8(2) suffers from two deficiencies also present in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1994, namely, 
it is sHent on the issue of a suitable comparator (for the purposes of determining indirect discrimination) 
and on the problem presented by the frequently overlooked phenomenon of compound discrimination. 
These two problems will be examined with reference to the US experience. The fact that I have 
designated these as deficiencies of section 8(2) does not mean that I think that these concerns should 
be catered for in the Constitution. They could more appropriately be catered for in ordinary legislation. 
However, these technical issues should be clarified if we do not wish to run the risk of leaving it up to 
the Courts to muddle through. 
3.3.1. The comparator for indirect discrimination:· In the context of allegations of indirect 
discrimination during the selection process of people, for whatever reason, a glaring lacuna in the 
American legal system exists, in that none of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Courts35, or the Uniform 
Guldelines38 drawn up by the various enforcement agencies, have bothered to define what is meant 
by •disparate impacr. 37 The question therefore still remains what group must be used as comparator 
to establish disparate impact/indirect discrimination. This lacuna has led to inconsistent applications of 
the disparate impact theory by the US Supreme Court. 
32
'(4) This Chapter shall not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons other than 
those bound in terms of section 7 (1). • 
331n terms of s 35(3) of the Constitution the courts are instructed to interpret any law (including the common law and 
customaty law) in the •spirit, purport and Objects• of Chapter 3. Furthermore, it is significant that s 35(3) explicitly includes the 
deYelopment of customaty law and the common law by the courts in terms of the guidance provided by Chapter 3. {'(3) In the 
interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law and customaty law, a court shall have due 
regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter. ·1 
34This is an example of Drittwirkung. See Van Aswegen A.: 7he Implications of a Bill of Rights for the Law of Contract and 
Del/ct' in South African Journal of Human Rights 1995: pp 50-69. 
35The locus classicus on disparate impact theory, Griaas v Duke Power 401 U.S. 424 (1971), introduced the concept but did 
not adequately define disparate impact. 
38 According to these Guidelines, validation is only and always required when adverse impact exists. Adverse impact is defined 
as a ·substantially different rate of selection in hiring, promotion, or other employment decision.• But substantially different from 
what? See Lerner B.: •Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality' in Supreme Court Review 1979: pp 17-49. 
37
.Disparate impact discrimination• is the term used in the US for what we refer to as •indirect discrimination·. 
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Three comparators or standards are possible: 0) pool-of-applicants38; Oi) general population figures39; 
or (iii) data on the qualified labour force in the area of recruitment"'°. Lemer41 suggests that the 
following guidelines should be followed: (i) General population figures are never an appropriate basis 
of comparison in disparate impact cases. (ii) The pool-of-applicants is an acceptable basis for a prima 
facie case of disparate impact only in cases involving incumbent employees all of whom met the same 
initial hiring standards and are successfully performing related jobs. (iii) In cases involving external 
applicants, the appropriate standard for a prima facie case of disparate impact is a comparison between 
an employer's workforce and the qualified labour force of the area of recruitment. [iv) In the latter case, 
pool-of-applicants data may be relevant in rebuttal, because willingness to take a job is a necessary, 
albeit not a sufficient, condition for hiring. In evaluating such data, the Court should take pains not to 
penalize defendants/employers for the consequences of affirmative action programmes, their own or 
those of others in their area of recruitment. (v) Plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to counter such 
rebuttal evidence by showing that defendant's action distorted the data by convincing qualified 
applicants that it would be futile to apply (for example, advertising bias). (vi) Face validity, otherwise 
known as reasonableness, should suffice to show that the selection device (test or non-test) is job 
related. (vii) If the defendant's selection practices have an adverse impact and they are not justified by 
face validity, then they should be held unlawful unless the defendant has formal validity data strong 
enough to prove that in this case, common sense is wrong (that is, thatalthough the device has no face 
validity, it is still valid). 
The arguments in favour of the above guidelines are compelling42 and it is suggested that when South 
Africa formulates similar legislation or enforcement agency guidelines, explicit provision should be made 
in these for standards of comparison to establish disparate impact in accordance with the proposals put 
forward by Lerner. 
3.3.2. Compound Discrimination43: The last topic to be covered in this section deals with the problem 
38Griggs v Duke Power 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
39Dotharrl v Rawlinson 433 U.S. 229 {1976). 
40Fumco Constr. Com. v Waters 438 U.S. 567, 17 FEP 1062 {1978j. 
41Lemer (1979): pp 3(J..39. 
42Lemer [(1979): pp 25-35}. 
43Shoben E.W.: "Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of race and Sex in Employment Discrimination', in New York 
University Law Review Vol. 55, November 1980: pp 783-836. 
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of •compound discrimination•. 44 This type of discrimination is a prime example of the disparity between 
legal and societal classifications of discrimination. It is not clear whether section 8(2) protects an 
individual against compound discrimination. For example, if the employer uses a selection process in 
which applicants must pass a written test and a height requirement, the test may discriminate against 
blacks and the height requirement against females, so that a black woman is doubly disadvantaged. The 
question is whether in such a case the individual must prove the grounds for discrimination separately 
(that is, that she is being discriminated against not because she is a black woman but because of her 
blackness and her gender, separately).45 It is, of course, possible that it is the interaction effect itself 
that is the source of the discrimination (race times gender) rather than the cumulative main effects of 
race and gender. The former is compound discrimination and should not be confused with double 
discrimination. Double discrimination may be described as the discrimination that someone suffers 
because he belongs to two different groups, both of which are adversely affected by an employer's 
practices, whereas compound discrimination results specifically from the fact that the person belongs 
to both groups.48 Although black females are not eo nomine a protected class under section 8(2), it 
can be argued that section 8(2) does protect compound groups, since the courts would entertain 
reverse discrimination claims by white males, who themselves are a compound group. 47 Nor is 
compound discrimination the same as 0 sex-plus" discrimination. Sex-plus discrimination occurs when 
a hiring practice, while not explicitly directed at a particular sex, operates to exclude one sex.48 In this 
situation the enquiry is whether the employer has created a category that unlawfully operates against 
a protected group. In the case of black women, the question is whether section 8(2) protects black 
women as a category and not whether a rule against blackness, which is applied only to women, 
"1 consider this topic worthy of inclusion for several tNSOns: Firstly, it is hot T&adily T&Cognized that compound groups, such 
as black females, might suffer a diffeT&nt kind of discrimination, distinct from that of either of the "main protected groups•, namely 
blacks or females. Secondly, that this type of discrimination is conceptually distinct from doub/e discrimination (the victim is 
discriminated against by vittue of being both black and female). And thitrlly, that even civil rights groups do not seem to T&Cognize 
this (for examp/e, feminists t18at /esbians as part of their group, and homosexuals likewise t18at them as part of their group) 
without T&Cognizing the possibility that they might be a distinct compound sub-group - this 18ads to the conundrum: aT& lesbians 
the female wing of the homosexual group or the /esbian wing of the feminist group? The ans~r. in tenns of compound 
discrimination analysis, is neither: they fonn a distinct group of their own. The danger of not T&Cognizing these "hidden• groups 
is that their inteT&sts aT& neglected in pursuit of the main protected groups' inteT&sts. I suspect that something analogous is 
happening in South Africa as T&gatrls gender issues championed by civil rights groups that aT& addT&ssing race issues (with the 
obligatory nod towatrls gender issues). 
45See Du Plessis L and Corder H. (1994): Understandina South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: 
p 143. The authors assume without further ado thats 8 covers compound groups. It is also not c/ear whether Du Plessis and 
Cotrler appT&Ciate the diffeT&nce ~n "double discrimination" and •compound discrimination". 
48For example, a v.omen who T&tums to the economically actiw. labour market after having T&aT&d her childT&n may be 
discriminated against for being female, by some employers, but also for being over forty years of age, by other employers (doub/e 
discrimination: sex and age). On the other hand, an employer may have nothing against employing white women or black males, 
but may discriminate against black females (this will be an instance of compound discrimination: race times sex). 
47Shoben (1980): pp 797 - 798. 
48Forexample, in Phillips v Martin Marietta Colp,, 400 U.S. 542 (1971), the US SupT&me Coult held that a rule against hiring 
female applicants with ,,,.school childT&n, although men with pr.school childT&n ~T8 hiT&d, violates Title VII. The rule applied 
only to a subset of persons with pr.school childT&n, and that subset was composed entitely of women. 
23 
amounts to discrimination against women. 
The logic of allowing protection against compound discrimination, should it occur, is unassailable: the 
problem arises in its application. For instance, to use the protected classes listed in section 8(2) as an 
example to construct an extreme case, how would one deal with a plaintiff who is an over-forty Zulu 
lesbian atheist, with limited education and who is blind and can only speak Zulu?411 In direct 
discrimination cases this should not be a problem In that intent and not the statistical effects of the 
alleged discriminatory employer Is at issue, but In a case based on indirect discrimination the sample 
(used as comparator) would in all likelihood be too small to make reliable inferences from statistical data. 
Based on the protected categories listed in section 8(2), one. could contrive the following extreme 
example to illustrate the theoretical problem: In section 8(2) there are arguably fourteen separate 
protected categories (let us call these the "main protected groups") listed. These fourteen groups may, 
for the purposes of compound discrimination, be combined into a total of sixteen thousand three 
hundred and sixty nine compound groups. Together with the "main protected groups" this comes to a 
total of sixteen thousand three hundred and eighty three groups potentially to be protected under 
section 8(2)!50 
3.3.3. The groups protected by s 8(2): The effect of the phrase • ... without derogating from the 
generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture 
or language• is what concerns us here. Despite the extensiveness of this list it is clear from the words 
• ... without derogating from the generality of this provision ... •that the listed categories do not constitute 
a numerus clausus. The question is whether the protected categories can be extended without limitation 
or whether the recognition of additional (unlisted) categories should be limited to grounds analogous 
to the listed classes. Some authors are of the opinion that since the grounds listed all involve personal 
characteristics that are immutable • ... at least in the sense that they cannot be changed by the choice 
of the individuar51 , the extension of protected categories must be limited to similarly immutable 
grounds. Since assumptions relating to genetics and the philosophical issue of individual choice versus 
predetermination are all relevant to this presumptive principle for limiting the extension of the protected 
49Example adapted from Shaben (1980): p 796. 
SDrhe mind boggles if one wel9 to entertain the possibiliy of bringing ethnicity and language into the equation, not as one 
variable each, but broken down into the diversity found in South Africa (e.g. fourteen languages). A troubling aspect of grouf> 
based affirmative action programmes based on race (rather than ethnicity) is the possibility that one black ethnic group may be 
allowed to discriminate against another black ethnic group with impunity (e.g. against a Zulu by a Xhoza company). 
51Cachalia et al (1994), quoted in Albertyn & Kentridge [(1994): p 168]. 
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categories, I do not find this line of reasoning persuasive. 52 Albertyn and Kentridge rejects the •listed 
and analogous grounds" approach as being a • ... too narrow reading of the named grounds•. 53 The 
authors propose that a better view would be that the listed grounds all reflect "elements which are 
constitutive of human identity"54 and that therefore • ... any additional ground need not necessarily be 
an immutable personal characteristic, but must be a valuable aspect of human identity. •155 They 
conclude that the principle that should guide the extension of the protected classes should be the 
"principle of anti-subordination". 58 Thus, • ... it is necessa'ry to show [for an unlisted group seeking the 
protection of section 8(2)] that the discrimination in question is unfair in that It creates or reinforces the 
subordination of a vulnerable group or class of persons. 967 According to Albertyn and Kentridge, the 
application would be successful only • ... if striking down that discrimination will either counter pervasive 
disadvantage or strike down an exercise of arbitrary and irrational power.11!18 This seems like circular 
reasoning to me. Firstly, it is difficult to conceive of "pervasive disadvantage• that will not overlap with 
one or more of the listed categories. Secondly, the •... exercise of arbitrary and irrational power" 
(presumably directed at a definable group) is per definition discrimination. This amounts to saying that 
any group can claim protection under section 8(2) provided it can show intentional (or direct) 
discrimination or if the group Is, as a group, in a disadvantaged position (presumably this refers to 
indirect discrimination). The latter is too wide (in that it brings purely socio-economic disadvantage) 
under the ambit of section 8(2). It should be noted that whereas I have pointed out earlier that the so-
called Individual-based socio-economic model of affirmative action would address socio-economic 
52For instance, may it be said that a person's 191iglon, cuJtu19 or language is a matter of choice or al9 these immutable? A 
freedom of opportunity analysis would yield the conclusion that the person bom in the "wrong• cultu19 (and who the19fo19 has 
to switch cultu19s) is faced by an app19Ciab/y mo19 difficult hutr:lle than the person bom in the "right' cultu19. See "equality of 
opportunities• in Chapter 2 supra. 
53Albeltyn & Kentridge (1994): p 168. 
54Albeltyn & Kentridge (1994): p 169. The "human identity" approach does not entail the assumption of immutability (as does 
the "listed and analogous grounds" approach). It is of course not clear what constitutes the "human identity": The "natu19-nurtu19• 
controwrsy in psychology has been raging for most of this century with as yet no clear winner. Maybe the outcome of the "Human 
Genome Project" will tip the balance in favour of natul9 - but what if a person may then be offel9d the choice of pharmaceutical 
interventions to change the personality effects of his genetic make-up? "Prosac" is just such a psychotropic drug. If I can choose 
to change my human identity then it may be (if not now, then in the futu19) that the wry "elements of human identity" may become 
a matter of choice. It will be much better to work with the "principle of anti-subotr:lination" as a moral imperative without trying to 
derive it from little understood psychological constructs. 
55Albertyn & Kentridge (1994): pp 168-169. 
58Albertyn & Kentridge (1994): p 170. 
57 Albeltyn & Kentridge (1994): p 170. Discrimination as a social phenomenon seems partly 19f/ectiw of but also partly the 
19sult of vulnerability (i.e. society tends to discriminate against vulnerable groups, thel9by incl9asing their vulnerability). If this 
is comJCt it poses a proportionality problem: how to ascribe the discriminated-against person's social status to discrimination 
by panialling out the effects of other causes of vulnerability? Rawls (1971) provides a common sense answer, namely, do not ewn 
try to do this, rather operate by the maxim that initial disadvantage (such as accident of birth and the "natural lottery") should not 
be perpetuated by society. 
58Albertyn & Kentridge (1994): p 170. 
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disparities irrespective of its causes, 58 it does not follow that these same disparities can automatically 
be labelled as "discriminatory". 
3.4. THE •AFFIRMATIVE ACTION" CLAUSE [S 8(3)) 
3.4.1. The meaning of •designed to achieve• (s 8(3)(a)): The adoption of the words •designed to 
achieve• in section 8(3) by the writers of our Constitution has an interesting history. According to 
Mureinik8°, an earlier draft contained the words •aimed at." which gave rise to some controversy during 
the Kempton Park negotiations. The controversy surrounding the words •aimed ar (used in an earlier 
draft) revolved around the concern that this formulation would have authorized a court to enquire 
whether a measure was aimed at undoing disadvantage, but not whether it was likely to succeed.61 It 
was to meet this concern that the words •aimed ar were replaced with the words •designed to achieve•, 
which change Mureinik argues should guide a court when interpreting the wording •designed to achieve• 
to conclude that the intention was to include both the means and the ends sought by the measure since 
this is the more justifiable interpretation. 62 Thus, whereas "aimed ar refers to intention more explicitly, 
"designed to achieve" may signify either intention or competence/ability to achieve the end product. 
However, given the history attached to this phrase, it can be inferred that the intention of the drafters 
was to exclude the first possible meaning of the words •designed to achieve". 
3.4.2. The meaning of •unfair discrimination• (ss 8(2) and 8(3)): It should be noted that the original 
meaning of the word "discrimination" was simply the ability to distinguish between classes or groups 
without the pejorative connotation commonly assigned to the word in present usage. 63 The word 
"discriminationR in modem usage refers to the practice of selecting between people or groups on the 
basis of inappropriate criteria or arbitrarily. Implicit in this usage of the word is the pejorative quality of 
"unfairness". This interpretation would render the qualification "unfair" used in sections 8(2) and 8(3) 
superfluous, hence the conclusion that the drafters intended the word "discrimination" to carry its original 
non-pejorative meaning. It is therefore not "discrimination" per se that should be eradicated but •unfair 
59See Chapter 1. 
80Mureinik E. (1994): 0A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights• in South African Journal on Human Rights 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: pp 31-48. 
611.e. the court may review "the intentions of the authors of the measure, but not its effects {Mureinik (1994): p 47}. 'The anxiety 
was that the courts would have been confined to scrutinizing the ends sought by the measure, and precluded from scrutinizing 
the means chosen to realize those ends• (.op cit). 
62Mureinik {(1994): p 48}; Davis {(1994): p 210}. 
63As in the phrase 0he has discriminating taste•. 
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discrimination·. Benign forms of discrimination, such as affirmative action, are therefore permissible.84 
Albertyn and Kentridge come very close to denying that discrimination against prMleged (read white) 
South Africans can ever amount to unfair discrimination provided that It is as the result of a rational 
means of achieving the objective of full equality by promoting the interests of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination (this, despite a disclaimer to the contrary). 85 
3.4.3. Does s 8(3) deviate from or supplement s 8(1)?: Equality is a core value permeating our 
Constltution.68 This being the case, the question may be asked whether section 8(3) deviates from or 
supplements the principle of equality as embodied in section 8(1) and protected in section 8(2). If 
affirmative action is viewed as supplementing the equality clause in that It promotes substantive equality, 
section 8(3) should be afforded a generous and liberal interpretation in line with the principle that 
provisions conferring rights should be given an expansive interpretation and in favour of those rights. 87 
On the other hand, if the affirmative action clause is seen as an exception to the fundamental value of 
equality, unfortunately necessitated by our past history of societal and statutory discrimination, a more 
restrictive interpretation of section 8(3) limiting the scope for a wide range of affirmative action 
interventions would be more appropriate. Although the words "shall not preclude" used in section 8(3)(a) 
do appear to express an exception, the words "in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms• indicate a contrary intention. One could also argue that section 8(3)(a) limits 
section 8(2).68 The effect of such a construction will be .that it is implicitly recognised that affirmative 
action amounts to unfair discrimination.69 This construction, combined with the mistaken idea70 that 
section 8(3)(a) is not subject to s 33 scrutiny, 71 is dangerous because It places no limitation on the 
harm that may be done to non-beneficiaries of affirmative action as long as the programme satisfies the 
64Generally, see Cheadle H.: 'Impact of the Constitution on Labour Law' in Cheadle et al (1994): pp 94--112. From the "victim's' 
perspective affirmative action will not be 'benign• but it may nevertheless be lawful - see •unfairness and reasonableness• under 
Section 4.11.2. 
85Albettyn & Kentridge (1994): p 162. 
86See Du Plessis and Corder (1994). 
67Smith (1995): p 88. 
66As do Du Plessis and Corder (1994): pp 12fH30. 
69Because the adjective ·unfair' in s 8(2) already allows for fair discrimination. Ifs 8(3)(a) limits the prohibition of •unfair 
discrimination' it can only mean that affirmative action that is unfair but satisfies the provisions of s 8(3)(a), will be constitutional 
despite its unfairness [i.e. regardless of s 8(2)]. 
70See Section 3.2. 
71See Davis (1994); and Du Plessis and Corder (1994): p 130. The latter authors argue thats 8(3)(a) does not confer a right 
(because, so the argument goes, it merely allows for the possible future introduction of affirmative action programmes rather than 
creating a right to affirmative action). Thus, since the limitation clause provides for the limitation of rights (rather than possible 
·entitlements?, s 33 is not applicable to s 8(3)(a). 
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requirements set by section 8(3)(a)72 and because it conflates the ideas of •tairness" and 
·reasonableness". 73 
Previously, it was stressed that one should not conflate the aspirational aspect of the Constitution with 
the constitutionality of the means to pursue the constitutional ideal. In discussing the relationship 
between section 8(3) and sections 8(1) and 8(2), Albertyn and Kentridge do just that.74 They propose 
that section 8(3) was included ex abundante cautela (since sections 8(1) and 8(2) already commit us 
to substantive equality) and • ... simply makes explicit the fact that substantive equality permits treatment 
which Is differentiated according to the needs of the recipient.• This reading of section 8(3) Is defective 
for several reasons. Firstly, the authors isolate "needs• as the only value underlying distributive justice. 
This may be appropriate in certain cases (e.g. feeding schemes or free hospital care for the indigent), 
but certainly not for all cases. In the employment context a needs-based notion of affirmative action 
would totally disregard efficiency considerations. For instance, a welfarist or needs-based approach 
would justify demands for full employment and minimum wages legislation. As regards only the latter, 
one could also attack this equality-as-welfare-approach75 as immoral and internally inconsistent in 
situations where the government cannot guarantee the payment of unemployment insurance, at least 
at the level of the minimum wage.78 This attack is premised on the economic fact that minimum wages 
bar some people from the employment market, thereby making them pay for the minimum wage of the 
lucky few who are employed. It is internally inconsistent in that the needs-based notion of distributive 
justice would require that those in greatest need should proportionally be the greatest beneficiaries of 
social goods, but under a minimum wage regime the unemployed victims of the minimum incomes 
policy will be subsidising the less unfortunate (i.e. the lowly paid but employed beneficiaries of the 
scheme). Secondly, the authors do not distinguish between different modalities of affirmative action, and 
simply assume that all types of intervention that are aimed at greater substantive _equality and are 
reasonably capable of achieving this, would be constitutional. 
Both Davisn and Albertyn and Kentridge78 base their arguments for the supplementary role of section 
72Which amounts to an 'effectiveness test" and that it must be for the benefit of people previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. 
73See the discussion under •unfairness and reasonableness• in Section 4.6. infra. 
74Albertyn & Kentridge {1994): pp 172-174. 
75See Dworkin R.: 'What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare' in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 10, No. 3, 1981: pp 18~ 
246. 
78See Hayek F.A {1960): The Constitution of Uberty London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 
noavis {1994): pp 196-211. 
78Atbertyn & Kentridge {1994): pp 14fJ.178. 
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8(3) on American and Canadian case law without fully appreciating the differences between our 
Constitution and these foreign comparators. Limiting myself to the US situation, it should be self-evident 
that the US Supreme Court had to employ an extensive reading of •equality", given the ~re bones of 
the phrase •equal protection of the laws" contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, simply because 
society's evolving understanding of fairness and equality demanded it, and there were no other 
constitutional provisions to rely upon. Not so the situation in South Africa; our constitutional fathers tried 
to "codify" the lessons from abroad and explicitly included an affirmative action provision. Although our 
constitutional writers had the benefit of learning from the experience of other jurisdictions, this may well 
prove to be a two-edged sword in that the process of codification inevitably entaUs the use of different 
words and structures, which may have the unintended effect of giving a different texture and meaning 
to the provisions (although the intention was simply to express and encapsulate in words the 
jurisprudence developed by the Courts). Thus, for South African commentators to base their arguments 
for reading affirmative action into the equality provision as formulated section 8(1), on US case-law, is 
dubious, precisely because we have a section 8(3), whereas the US Courts had to evolve the meaning 
of their equality clause without the benefit of such an affirmative action clause. 79 The US Courts were 
forced by necessity to take recourse to an expansive reading of the equality clause, rendering it into 
something approximating a procrustean bed. Our Courts need not do this, simply because we have 
recourse to section 8(3). 
I would have had no quarrel with an extensive interpretation of the equality clause contained in section 
8(1) of our Constitution to include the aspirational ideal of substantive equality, but the. problem arises 
when such an aspirational interpretation is used to render section 8(2) and section 8(3) superfluous, with 
the barely hidden intention to advance an equality-as-welfare agenda. Lest I be accused of reading too 
much into the expansive approach to the equality provision, I offer the following example of the 
boundless scope some proponents wish to establish for government intervention, based on a 
detextuallzed interpretation of section 8(1) [in the sense of ignoring the fact that our Constitution does 
happen to have a section 8(2) and a section 8(3)]. According to Albertyn and Kentridge80 a proper 
reading of section 8(1) entails the following: it includes the substance and content of the law; it covers 
laws which afford benefits as well as laws which prohibit or regulate; it also opposes subordination and 
disadvantage in and through the law; it entails a commitment to making reparation and restitution; and 
it negates the distinction between public and private as "incoherent". According to this "expansive 
reading" of section 8(1 ), lawmakers and judges would have untrammelled authority to advance a welfarist 
vision of society, in the pursuit of which common law rights and duties as between private actors could 
~hat the authors of Cachalia et al recognize this is clear from the following: "The effect of having one limitation clause is 
that much of the US jurisprudence concerning the different standards of review that the US Supreme Court has developed in 
respect of each of its guaranteed rights is just not applicable• [Cachalia A, Cheadle H., Davis D., Haysom N., Maduna P. and 
Marcus G. (1994): Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: pp 109-110}. 
80Albertyn and Kentridge (1994): p 160. 
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be interfered with at will. 
3.4.4. The meaning of the phrase -rull and equal enjoyment" [s 8{3){a)]: "True• or "substantive 
equality of opportunity" is seen as the goal of affirmative action and a recognition of the fact that, given 
past societal discriminatory practices, the imposition of antidiscrimlnatory measures will not, by itself, 
realize the goal of giving every member of society an equal chance of fulfilling his potential and life 
goals. Formal equality81, by itself, will not result in actual equality of access to those social goods82 
necessary for obtaining equal opportunities. It is therefore necessary to take positive steps to achieve 
these objectives. Equality Is an issue in the real world because scarce resources are unequally 
distributed in accordance with criteria and institutionalized processes and norms that are allegedly 
suspect. Consequently those who are at the bottom end of the allocative continuum are restricted in the 
exercise of their rights (although these rights may nominally be equally allocated regardless of group 
membership), thereby preventing them from enjoying or effectively striving towards the good life. Rights 
can be exercised effectively in pursuit of the good life only if the bearer of those rights possesses the 
necessary economic means; likewise, freedom of choice83 is but an empty letter if the choice is 
between starvation and acceptance of a degrading job paying below the breadline (thereby ensuring that 
the incumbent's range of "choices" will remain static). Although all members of society may have equal 
political, legal, civil and other "basic rights", it is evident that the effectiveness of one's rights is 
dependent on one's economic position84, and one's capacity to transform these into actual 
achievements.85 Indeed, the power of words of choice and contract to conceal coercion, should not 
be denied. The rhetoric of choice is frequently invoked to protect vested interests against those who 
have been disadvantaged in the past.86 It follows that I am of the opinion that section 8(3) embodies 
the ideal of real or substantive equality rather than mere formal equality as provided for in anti-
discriminatory measures. Three cautionary notes need to be sounded to qualify the preceding statement: -
(i) it still leaves open the question of "equality of what?"; (ii) the scope of the "rights and freedoms" 
81As provided for by anti-discrimination rules. 
821ncluding but not restricted to access to education, health care and jobS. 
83
"For poverty and the lack of satisfaction of basic needs which poV8rty entails constitute an impediment to freedom as well, 
to the basic freedom to formulate and pursue a meaningful life plan and control one's life as one desires• [Goldman A.H.: "Justice 
and Hiring by Competence• in American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 14 No. 1 January 19n: pp 17-28 on p 21]. 
84 
"Even though money generally cannot buy extra helpings of rights directly, it can buy services that, in effect, produce more 
or better rights .... Money buys legal services that can obtain preferred treatment before the law; it buys platforms that give extra 
weight to the owner's freedom of speech; it buys influence with elected officials and thus compromises the principle of one 
person, one l.'Ote" [Okun AM. (1975): Equality and efficiency: The big tradeoff Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution: p 22]. 
Regarding the attenuating effect on democracy by the concentration of wealth in the hands of some individuals, see also Rawls 
J. (1971): A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
86See the discussion on "Human diversity in capacity to achieve versus equality in freedom to achieve" in Section 2.2.3. supra. 
88 
"The effects of legal doctrine in obscuring the law's role in subordination - through claims of neutrality and meritocracy 
.. : [Greene LS.: "Breaking Form" in Stanford Law Review Vol. 44, 1992: pp 909 - 925: p 922]. 
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referred to In section 8(3)(a) has likewise not yet been addressed; and, (iii) most important of all, one 
should not confuse the recognition of the aspirational dimensions of the Constitution with the claim 
that the ideals espoused by the Constitution may be pursued by whatever means possible. Our 
Constitution may express the ideal of an egalitarian society with parity of material resources for all 
members of our society, but one cannot infer without further ado from this constitutional aspiration that 
the Constitution does not place any limits on the means to achieving that end. 
3.4.5. The meaning of •all rights and freedoms•: I do not propose to discuss and analyse this phrase 
in any detail. At a minimum people should enjoy equality of opportunity In respect of at least the rights 
enumerated In Chapter 3 of the Constitution as well as other rights (such as common law rights) not In 
conflict with the listed constitutional rights and subject to the limitations clause (section 33). Since I have 
concluded that it is equality of opportunity and not equality of outcome that is protected by the 
Constitution it follows that one cannot derive substantive claims from most of the rights guaranteed in 
Chapter 3. 87 For instance, the right to acquire and hold rights in property ection(s 28) or the right freely 
to engage in economic activity (section 26) cannot be used as a base for claiming the right to have 
property equally distributed or to employment respectively (even though this end result may well be an 
aspirational value of our Constitution). I tum next to the meaning of the word 1reedom·. 
A more difficult question than the one concerning •rights" is whether the term ireedom• was included 
in section 8(3)(a) simply to distinguish substantive rights from "negative rights" (i.e. the individual's right 
to be protected from unwarranted state interference) or whether 1reedom" can be seen as a substantive 
right per se. The latter interpretation will recognize that freedom of choice may be of more than just 
instrumental value in that the range of choices available to an individual may be determinative of his 
quality of life independent from the choices he in fact makes. For example, fasting is not just starving: 
it is choosing to starve when one does have other options. In examining a starving person's achieved 
well-being, it is of direct interest to know whether he is fasting or simply does not have the means to get 
enough food. Similarly, choosing a life-style is not exactly the same as having that life-style no matter 
how chosen, and one's well-being does depend on how that life-style happened to emerge.89 One 
could therefore conclude that the "full and equal enjoyment of all ... freedoms• should be read as an 
instruction to treat the range of freedoms as an autonomous enjoyment of a substantive right, distinct 
from the mere instrumentality view of freedom. 
87This is of course not to deny that many of the rights inevitably have a substantive component, e.g. the rights of children and 
a clean environment will, if given effect to, place substantive duties on the state. 
881nteresting/y, the Namibian Constitution distinguishes between ·rights" and "freedoms·. 
89Sen A (1992): Inequality Reexamined New York: Oxford University Press Inc: pp 117-118. 
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3.5. PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION [S 8(4)] 
Section 8(4) creates a rebuttable presumption that discrimination on any of the grounds listed in section 
8(2) constitutes unfair discrimination. On a prirna facie showing by an applicant of discrimination on any 
of the grounds listed in section 8(2), the onus wHI shift to the respondent to justify the discrimination 
(e.g. as being a "business necessity" or a "bona fide occupational qualification·ei. The words • ... as 
contemplated in that subsection ... • indicate that this presumption would operate only in cases based 
on the grounds specified in section 8(2); applicants relying on an unlisted ground cannot invoke section 
8(4) and thus will have to show both that discrimination occurred and that such discrimination was 
unjustlfied.81 
I now tum to the question whether the conception of discrimination viewed from the perspective of the 
victim, is the only or the best way to approach this phenomenon, especially as it relates to matters of 
proof. To put it another way, could an applicant rely on proof of discrimination on the part of the 
discriminator on a ground other than the ground allegedly applicable in his case, in order to satisfy the 
requirements of sections 8(2) and 8(4) and to cause the onus to shift to the respondent, as explained 
in the previous paragraph? 
3.5. 1. Atomized and Generalized Conceptions of Discrimination: The most common way of 
proscribing discriminatory treatment Is by reference to certain classes of potential victims and to outlaw 
discrimination against these protected groups.82 This approach to discrimination presupposes that 
people discriminate against those with a particular set of attributes associated with some identifiable, 
discrete group. A further supposition is that people generally discriminate on a differential basis, 
depending on the group in question. The result of such an "atomized"83 approach to discrimination is 
that evidence of discrimination against a group other than the plaintiff's should generally not be 
admissible to prove discrimination in the case under consideration. Furthermore, a group not recognized 
by the law as a protected group would not have the option of convincing a court to extend legal 
protection to their group by showing discrimination against another (already protected) group. 
There is, however, another way of looking at discrimination, namely from the point of view of the 
perpetrator. Whereas the atomized approach begins by identifying the kind of discrimination with the way 
in which victims might describe themselves, the generalized approach uses as its starting point the way 
~his terminology is borrowed from the US jurisprudence and Tttle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
91Albertyn & Kentridge (1994): pp 174-175. 
92See the listed protected groups in s 8(2) of Act 200 of 1993. 
93This term is borrowed from Freshman {Freshman (1990): pp 241-273]. 
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in which the perpetrator views people who do not belong to the group that he favours or prefers. This 
generalized view of discrimination is based on the premise, for which there exists a considerable body 
of evidence,94 that people who are prejudiced against one group are generally prejudiced against out-
groups. The generalized view of discrimination does not assert that the atomized view of group specific 
and differential discrimination is invalid but simply that it is too restricted a view of the way in which 
people who tend to discriminate, generally do discriminate. Generalized discrimination may take many 
forms, for instance viewing attributes that would be regarded as commendable in a member of the in-
group, as a negative feature if exhibited by a member of an out-group.1111 Where the perpetrator favours 
members of a preferred group, he wUI tend to attach attributes to an Individual by virtue of that person's 
group membership rather than gMng proper consideration to the Individual's actual attributes.96 
If recognition is to be given to the very real phenomenon of generalized discrimination, this will make 
it possible for people of one group to use evidence of discrimination against another group in support 
of a claim of discrimination against their group. 97 It will also enable a previously unprotected group to 
assert a claim for protection and to bolster their allegation of discrimination against their group by 
proving discrimination against another (protected) group. 98 The reason why this extension of protection 
is more likely under the generalized view of discrimination Is that under this doctrine discriminatory 
motive Is rebuttably presumed to be present against all out-groups once discrimination is proved in 
respect of any one group. Whether the norms of society will regard a particular out-group worthy of 
protection is, of course, a different matter. But at least, if recognition is given to the fact of discrimination 
against that group, the question of the value of protecting it is brought to the fore. 99 
94See for instance AllportG.W. (1954). Also the following N.o quotes from F19shman [F19shman (1990): p 249]: •ffthe19's one 
thing that 19p19sents a lawlike statement in social psychology, it's that a person who's p19judiced toward one group is p19judiced 
toward others.• And •(n)ot surprisingly, negative attitudes toward lesbian and gay people correlate strongly with traditional, sexist 
concepts about the appropriate role of men and women.• 
95A good example of this occurred in Price Watemouse v Hopkins. 109 S.C. 1775 (1989): A female employee was not made 
a partner because she was too assertive and not feminine enough. Assertiveness in a white male is a valued attribute, in a female 
or black it may become a negative quality, as in •bitchiness•, •butchness• or •pushiness·. 
96 As happens in stereotyping. An example of this is 19fusing to consider a woman for a job that is 199arded as the p19serw 
of males, irrespective of the fact that the woman applicant in question may possess the attributes 19quil9d for the job. An example 
of this occurred in Ntsangani v Golden Lay Farms (1992) 13 f1=:1. 1199 (IC): The employer accepted, without testing the assumption, 
that women do not possess the physical sf19ngth to do a certain kind of work. 
97 F19shman: •sut limiting evidence only to the atomized group of women makes no sense if an employer is motivated by a 
p19fe19nce for a group, such as white Protestant males, that excludes not just women, but members of other atomized groups 
as weir [F19shman (1990): p 255]. 
96For instance, HN/AIDS suffel9rs, who at p19sent do not enjoy specific protection against discrimination under s 8(2). It 
should be noted that in the context of the example given In the text, HN /AIDS suffe19rs a19 not 199arded hel9 as a group being 
discriminated against because of a •disability" {which is an explicitly listed group under s 8(2)]. Whether HN/AIDS or TB or STD's 
(or whatever disease carrying a social stigma) can be 199arded as a •disability" in terms of s 8(2) is not discussed (although I 
think it should). 
99Furthermol9, this could also provide a solution to the problem of alleging and proving compound and double discrimination, 
neither of which is currently explicitly covel9d under s 8(2). 
CHAPTER 4: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ANDS 8 OF THE CONS11TUTION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter affirmative action is subjected to constitutional scrutiny in terms of section 8 of Act 200 
of 1993. A comprehensive enquiry into affirmative action ·should comprise at least the following topics: 
the operational and moral bases of affirmative action; the balance between affirmative action and 
freedom; the balance between affirmative action and efficiency considerations; and the aspirational and 
permissible objectives of the Constitution as it relates to equality and liberty. Some, if not all, of these 
concerns will be addressed in this chapter. 
4.2. MODALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
According to a taxonomy proposed by Sloat three modalities or forms of affirmative action can be 
distinguished: a strong, an intermediate and a weak form. 1 In the strong variant a person qualifies 
for preferential treatment solely on the grounds that he/she possesses an immutable characteristic (e.g. 
an employee is promoted because she is a female, without satisfying any of the job specifications). In 
the intermediate/moderate variant of affirmative action the person meets the minimum 
standards/qualification for the job and is given preference over another candidate who is better qualified, 
because of some immutable characteristic which he/she possesses but the better qualified person does 
not (e.g. the job specifies matric as a minimum qualification but preferably a bachelors degree, and a 
black matriculant is promoted rather than the white male graduate candidate). In the weak variant of 
affirmative action a black/female/handicapped/etc employee is promoted in preference to an able 
bodied white male only if both candidates are equally qualified for the job. 
4.2.1. Strong variant of affirmative action: To this classification one could add another variant, namely 
a system whereby one group is excluded from jobs/promotions based on an immutable characteristic 
(as happened with job reservation in terms of s 77 of Act 28 of 1956, repealed in the 1970s). Now it 
would be evident that this variant is what is commonly referred to as "apartheid employment policies" 
and that it amounts to a restatement of Sloot's strong variant of affirmative action. The former is 
formulated in terms of the groups excluded whereas the latter is formulated in terms of the groups 
included, but both have the effect of absolutely excluding certain groups. The question may be asked 
whether, if it is correct that the strong variant is simply a restatement and application of apartheid, it is 
of constitutional significance which group is included/excluded. That is, could the strong variant of 
affirmative action, if applied to include blacks (and exclude whites) be constitutional? The answer to this 
question should be no. Even though such a policy would indubitably be very effective in promoting 
1SJoot {1986): p 217. 
34 
greater substantive equality between groups, it would be exclusionary and denigrating in its operation 
and would be counter to the constitutional principle of reconciliation contained In the "afteramble" to our 
Constitution. Furthermore, since this may well entail the appoinment of totally incompetent people, this 
may lead to Inefficiencies and a shrinkage of the economic pie, thereby working to the detriment of all 
the people, including those whom the system is supposed to help. From this Smith concludes that such 
a system would not be constitutional.2 
4.2.2. Weak variant of affirmative action: What about Sloot's "weak variant" of affirmative action? This 
variant amounts to a slight deviation from what could be called the "colour-blind" or libertarian model 
of affirmative action. Basic to the colour-blind vision of affirmative action are the values associated with 
conservative libertarianism. This entails the supremacy of individual3 rights and the merit principle 
together with minimal state intervention. According to this view discrimination is an abomination and 
should be outlawed. But so should affirmative action as this amounts to no more than reverse 
discrimination.4 Adherents to this model deny that the application of their policy will ultimately deliver 
only formal equality. Their vision holds that so-called •protected groups• or "minorities• will over time 
reach parity with the dominant group through their own exertions and innate abilities. Klug criticizes the 
colour-blind model for being too narrow a base from which to address past injustices; he asserts that 
to limit affirmative action to compensation for past victims, is to seek "to preseNe the structural integrity 
of the prevailing system of production and distribution by merely shuffling some individuals as 
compensation for a history of systematic deprivation of a whole sector of society. 115 Now, while one 
could argue that the libertarian model would be appropriate in a society characterized by true equality 
and without a history of systematic discrimination, it seems clear that in a society such as ours, a 
deviation from the norm of equality of treatment would be justified precisely by our history referred to 
in section 8(3) of our Constitution. This weak deviation from the principle of equality of opportunity could 
also be justified on the basis that, in a situation of parity of individual merit, the importance of the 
constitutional objective of promoting the ideal of societal equality should prevail. Furthermore, if both 
individuals possess the same merit, there is no countervaUing principle whereby the person from the 
advantaged group should be given the job rather than the person from the disadvantaged group. The 
2Smith (1995). 
37/Je ethical analysis thus far finds that the greater the emphasis on the individual who alntady has access and choice, the 
more likely the opposition to affirmative action• {Taylor (1991): p 59]. 
'See Belz (1991), Peron (1992), Glazer (1991) and Abram (1991). [Glazer N.: •Racial Quotas• in Nieli R. (Ed) (1991): Racial 
Preference And Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centre: pp 3-27; 
Abram M.B.: •Fair Shakers and Social Engineers• in Nieli R. (Ed) (1991): Racial Preference And Racial Justice: The New Affirmative 
Action Controversy Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centre: pp 29-44]. 
5Klug (1992): pp 139-140. Interestingly, Klug is aWB/9 of the possibility of a "political process theory" challenge to grou{rbased 
affirmative action in a South Africa governed by blacks, as he specifically excludes "the group's present political status• as a 
consideration for determining a group's entitlement to preferential treatment (ibid: p 141). 
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only question remaining is whether in such a situation a pure chance allocation would not be required 
by our Constitution. Following Rawls8 it is submitted that a lottery is neither just nor unjust and therefore 
the outcome of a lottery would likewise not be just or unjust, it is simply a fact of life. Given this, it could 
well be that, if there is no other consideration or principle to take into account, that an ethically neutral 
method of allocation is the most appropriate. This however, is not the case, given our Constitution's 
commitment to the Ideal of equality and its commitment to the promotion of equality7, there is a strong 
constitutional imperative to award social goods to the disadvantaged person in situations of parity of 
merit. 
4.2.3. Moderate variant of affirmative action: This leaves us with the moderate variant of affirmative 
action. The three variants of affirmative action can be viewed from different perspectives, namely, from 
the perspective of equality, from the perspective of efficiency and from the perspective of liberty. On the 
dimension of efficiency, it is clear that the strong variant will least serve the interests of efficiency 
whereas the weak variant will serve it better, although not as well as the libertarian version which holds 
that the best person for the job must always be selected. On the other hand, neither the libertarian nor 
the weak variant of affirmative action would significantly promote a move towards greater equality that 
our Constitution directs us to aspire to. For this reason these two options are rejected. From the liberty 
perspective, it is evident that the strong variant is most intrusive on the employer's freedom to choose 
whom to select whereas the weak variant is the least so. Accepting Dworkin's contention that liberty 
should yield to equality, there are strong indications that equality considerations will trump liberty and 
consequently would rule out the weak variant of affirmative action. However, if employers' property rights 
and their freedom to choose are taken into account (together with the efficiency considerations 
mentioned earlier), one could argue that the strong variant of affirmative action is too great a negation 
of the value of liberty (which next to equality is pre-eminent in our Constitution), to pass constitutional 
scrutiny. The conclusion at this stage is therefore that the moderate variant of affirmative action seems 
to strike a balance between the demands of efficiency, equality and liberty. But this still leaves the 
question unanswered whether our Constitution would permit the selection on the basis of group 
membership only or whether there may be a different operational basis that will better fit our 
constitutional regime. I shall return to this question later. 
4.3. MEANS AND ENDS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
It is of determinative importance for the constitutional evaluation of affirmative action to have clarity on 
the purpose that one wishes to achieve by means of an affirmative action programme. Is the objective 
8Raw/s J. (1971). 
7See Chapter 3 supra. 
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of a retributive or compensatory nature or is it a means to achieve greater substantive equalit/ or 
promoting substantive equality of opportunity? Apart from other considerations, clarity on the objective 
to be promoted by an affirmative action Intervention is essential for evaluating the constitutionality of 
these programmes. Reference to two examples from foreign jurisdictions will illustrate this point. In the 
US a three-tier approach to constitutional review of statutory classification of groups of people was 
~e_,, 
adopted. Statutes that classify people on the basis of race JS automatically suspect and subjected to 
•strict scrutiny- review In terms of which a classification must be strictly relevant to the purpose of the 
legislation, that it is the least intrusive alternative available for promoting the legislature's objective and 
that this objective which serves as the basis for the justification of the classlflcation be •compelling• and 
not merely amount to a legitimate state purpose. A less demanding test, that of •intermediate level of 
review is applied in the case of classifications which serve important government objectives such as 
affirmative action interventions. 9 In low scrutiny cases (such as applied to legislation relating to 
classification in purely commercial matters) the rebuttable presumption is that the legislation is 
constitutional and the courts typically defer to the legislature's intent, requiring only a showing of 
rationality10 between the means and the end.11 In practice the differentiation between strict, 
intermediate and low scrutiny has the effect that legislation that is designated as warranting strict 
scrutiny is more often than not found to be unconstitutional while state actions that attract the lower 
levels of scrutiny tend to pass constitutional muster.12 The Indian Supreme Court has adopted a similar 
basis of review which entails that any classification must have a rational basis in relation to the object 
which the legislation seeks to achieve; a classification would be justified •... if it Is not palpable 
discriminatory, (and) as long as it has a rational basis. •13 From these examples, one could draw the 
almost trite conclusion that should an affirmative action intervention has as its objective explicit or 
implicit ·reverse discrimination• based on a scheme of racial classification, it would attract strict scrutiny 
and in all likelihood should not pass the constitutional test. It is only if one denies the possibility that any 
modality of affirmative action can ever amount to reverse discrimination that an enquiry into the means 
of affirmative action becomes unnecessary. 14 Although most South African writers 15 agree that section 
8Some writers assume that substantive or factual equality is the purpose of any affirmative action programme. See for instance 
Basson's comments on s 8(3)(a) of the Constitution [Basson (1994): pp 22-23]. 
9Davis (1994): p 203. 
10
'(A) legislative classification may be upheld only if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose•. Therefore 
'(w)hen faced with a challenge to a legislative classif1Cation under the rational-basis test, the coutt should ask, first, what the 
purposes of the statute are, and, second, whether the classification ·is rationally related to achievement of those purposes• 
[Brennan J. in United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v Fritz 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980)]. 
11Torke (1982): pp 282-283. 
12Hoffman (1990): pp 889-919. 
13Davis (1994): p 203. 
14As Albertyn & Kentridge {(1994): pp 149-178} seem to be doing. 
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8 allows constitutional scrutiny of the ends as well as the means of affirmative action programmes, they 
limit the means enquiry to an evaluation of the instrumentality of such programmes in achieving their 
purported ends. This is not sufficient, because limiting constitutional scrutiny to the efficiency of the 
means in attaining a laudable end, does not guard against the possibility of excessive encroachment of 
the rights or freedoms of non-beneficiaries of affirmative action by unconstitutional means. 
To summarize, we can draw the following preliminary conclusions: (i) any affirmative action scheme 
based on a racial classification justified by an objective amounting to reverse discrimination could be 
challenged as being unconstitutional; (Ii) if the objective of an affirmative action Intervention is to 
compensate for past injustices and employs racial classification as a means to that end, it may well be 
vulnerable to the attack that it is not a rational basis in terms of the object which the legislation seeks 
to achieve (because the most discriminated against individuals are not the beneficiaries); (iii) if the object 
of affimative action legislation is to promote greater equality in the substantive enjoyment of all 
fundamental rights and freedoms, it could also be argued that to use group-based racial classification 
is not rationally connected to the object of the legislation (for the same reason as in (ii)). These 
inferences will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. 
4.4. COMPENSATORY JUSTICE ARGUMENTS16 
The wording in section 8(2) and section 8(3) is open to the interpretation that what animates these 
provisions is the desire for restitution and compensation. Although, given our history, this interpretation 
is almost the most natural, one nevertheless needs to investigate the adequacy of these rationales to 
base affirmative action on. 
The compensatory justice argument is based on the moral and legal precept that a person who has 
been done a wrong in the past, has a claim for retribution against his wrongdoer. In this mould the 
argument for affirmative action is that blacks were harmed by discrimination by whites, by virtue of which 
they are now entitled to compensation. This argument is flawed in many respects. Firstly, it ignores the 
fact that, even if we accept that the victims of discrimination have redistributive rights, preferential hiring 
may violate the rights of some other persons. These conflicting rights, may for instance, be a basic right 
to equal treatment. 17 One will therefore have to show that violation of these rights is justified, for 
instance, to use American terminology, by a ·compelling governmenr interest and that affirmative action 
15See, for instance, the writings of Davis and Mureinik on s 8 [Davis (1994): pp 196-211; and Mureinik (1994): pp 31-48]. 
16This discussion is broadly based on that of Fullinwider [Fullinwider (1980): pp 30-44]. 
171n the US, white males have successfully based their attacks on affirmative action programmes on the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Citv of Richmond v Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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is a remedy "narrowly tailored' to achieve this objective. 18 The evaluation of social policy as being just 
or unjust will therefore hinge on the following: (i) does one regard the victims' claims as legitimate; (ii) 
does one regard these claims of such Importance that they may trump the claims to equal treatment of 
other people; and (iii) does one view the reparation as appropriate and just (that is, is affirmative action 
the best and just way to compensate victims of discrimination or should other forms of assistance be 
given)? A second objection to the compensatory justice argument is that morally it is wrong to penalize 
someone other than the wrongdoer and that in most instances the people who would be most adversely 
affected by affirmative action are young whites, who have the least blame for past discrimination. A third 
objection Is that it is morally dubious to compensate someone other than the victim, and that as not all 
blacks were disadvantaged by discrimination, it would be wrong to compensate all blacks. A fourth 
objection is that of proportionality: affirmative action has the consequence of compensating the least 
injured while doing little or nothing for the most disadvantaged, in that no-one contends that jobs should 
be given to the totally unqualified. Thus the principle of proportionality is not only not applied, it is in fact 
inverted, to grant the least injured the most compensation and vice versa. The opponents of 
compensatory justice as a basis for affirmative action therefore contend that it would only be an 
acceptable argument if the actual victim and the actual perpetrator can be identified and if the 
compensation is appropriate, given the harm suffered (and this is of course in reality difficult, if not 
impossible, to do). Defenders of the compensatory justice concept can retort that it is not a specific 
individual that is to blame but society as a whole and therefore society should carry the burden of 
compensation. On the face of it this argument Is acceptable given the institutionalized form apartheid 
took. The only problem Is that this does not provide a rationale for violating a specific individual's right 
to equal treatment when applying for a job. It is one thing to say that society or the government owes 
a debt, it is quite another to say that all Individuals within that society owe a debt, since the latter cannot 
be inferred from the former. 19 
Having established that compensatory justice arguments can be undermined by the difficulties relating 
to determination of the actual victim and perpetrator, individual desert, guilt and proportionality, in most 
cases, it can still be asserted that compensatory justice relates to groups and not to actual individuals. 
Fullinwider2° convincingly argues that it does not make sense to talk of group rights in this context. He 
points out that to proceed from the premise that as discrimination was addressed against a class, to the 
conclusion that affirmative action can vindicate the group interests of the victims of discrimination, is to 
181n Fullilove v Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) and Metro Broadcasting Inc. v Federal Communications Commission. 110 S. 
Ct. 2997 (1990) the American Supreme Court accepted the competing government interest argument to override the rights to equal 
treatment of the plaintiffs. In Richmond v Croson. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) the Court rejected the set-aside programme of the local 
authority, among others, because it was not narrowly tailored to achieVe the ·compelling interesr. · 
19By way of analogy, South Africa, as an entity recognized by international law, may incur foreign debts, this does not mean 
that South Africans as citizens have incurred or are liable for those debts. 
20Fu//inwider (1980): pp 58-61. 
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ignore two different senses In which the term •c1ass" or •group" is used. In the first instance 
discrimination was directed against a class "only In the trivial sense that discrimination against any 
individual is always based on some property or characteristic which the individual has in common with 
others. 1121 The fact that I discriminate against one or more persons of that class does not mean that 
I have discriminated against all the members of that class. This then is the mistake, according to 
Fullinwider, that proponents of the group-based compensation theory make: their conclusion (that is, 
the remedy suggested for the discrimination) Includes all members of the class whereas the 
discrimination affected only some members of the class. 
4.5. FREEDOM AND EFFECTIVENESS 
I regard choice in the matter of affirmative action of great practical importance for various reasons. It 
is highly unlikely that, by enforcing group-based quotas (as in racial quotas) without the option of opting 
out, the objective of eradicating racial prejudice or Its effects would be achieved.22 Will the extreme 
racist/chauvinist employer not find informal ways of making life on the shop-floor extremely unpleasant 
for blacks/women without incurring legal sanctions? May It not.be better, as suggested by Bell23, that 
prospective employees should be warned that an employer is a racist, so that they know beforehand24 
the dangers attendant to obtaining a job with him? If the effectiveness of any affirmative action 
programme is ultimately dependent on the willing cooperation of the employer, may It not be better to 
provide for the option to buy an exemption licence for those extreme cases in which the employee is 
likely to be the victim of invidious covert discrlmination?25 
The primary factor in the effectiveness equation of affirmative action seems to be the level of 
commitment of those who wield the power to implement and monitor affirmative action programmes, 
whether at the macro-level or the micro-level of the business enterprise. 26 Whereas It can safely be 
assumed that a new South African government will exhibit sufficient commitment, the effective 
21/f I discriminate against a person because of his halitosis, it is possible to define a class of smelly people against whom 
I discriminate. 
221ndeed, many would argue that racial quotas will increase racial animus rather than decrease it. 
23Bell D.: "Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Ad' in California Law Review Vol. 79, 1991: pp 597-611. 
24
"Black people, moreover, will no longer have to divine whether an employer, realtor, or proprietor wants to exclude them. 
The license will give them - and the world - ample notice. Those who seek to discriminate without a license will place their 
businesses at risk of serious, even ruinous penalties" [Bell (1991): p 609/. 
25This scheme will not remove all instances of covert discrimination since some employers (those that fall in the less extreme 
category) may find the fine/exemption licence fee too high yet still practise discrimination. The remedy for this is to make the 
costs associated with ·unlicensed discrimination· prohibitively expensive. See Bell (1991). 
26See Asma/ (1992); Hofmeyr (1993); Innes (1992). 
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transmission of this commitment to the level of the undertaking can be realized only partly by an 
enforcement agency. A speedy and smooth implementation of affirmative action programmes over a 
wide spectrum wHI be possible only with the willing acceptance of such programmes by chief executive 
officers of private enterprise. 27 Commitment as the crucial ingredient in an affirmative action policy and 
programme is thus seen as a two-tiered issue. It is argued that the chances of winning this commitment 
at the micro-level will be greatly enhanced if CEO's are given some choice in the matter (if only to the 
extent that they wish to embark directly and commit their organizations to an affirmative action drive; 
not the freedom to decide to avoid liability for such programmes). It is also hypothesised that a national 
affirmative action policy that allows CEO's to translate affirmative action decisions into strategic business 
decisions will further facilitate the process of acceptance. 28 
An individual-based socio-economic affirmative action model offers this form of bounded voluntarism,29 
the choice can easily be formulated in terms of break-even points and in the terminology of strategic 
and competitive advantage. Whereas a completely voluntarist approach to affirmative action has proved 
a chimera, there is proof that at the micro-level affirmative action programmes entered into voluntarily 
by companies were more successful than in instances where affirmative action was enforced. 30 
4.6. GROUP-BASED QUOTA SYSTEMS 
A group-based quota system can be defined as any affirmative action programme in terms of which 
pressure is exerted on an employer to make decisions based solely on group membership and in terms 
of which compliance with the programme is similarly determined by sole reference to the composition 
of the employer's workforce in terms of proportional or other prescribed ratio representation of defined 
protected groups. The traditional criticisms of affirmative action are directed against this class of 
programme. 
4.6.1. Evaluation of group-based quota programmes: It is undeniably true that affirmative action 
27The CEO's need to be co-opted by the government as •enforcement agents•, and it is submitted that this will only materialize 
if a less than high-handed approach is followed in which private industry can assimilate affirmative action as part of their business 
environment. In any event, should such an approach fail, less desirable options a19 still open to government, although at the cost 
of resentment and increased resistance. 
28That is, if affinnative action is packaged in such a manner that it is amenable to the way in which managers al9 accustomed 
to approach business challenges and decisions. 
29rhe sense in which I use the term "bounded voluntarism• can be compa19d with the situation of a US company which has 
to make the decision whether to tender for a federal contract or a contract that falls outside the ambit of Executive Orr!er 11246. 
This is a business decision and no appeal to ethics is required. There is American research which indicates that the position of 
protected groups who al9 employed by federal government contractors improved relative to people not so employed. 
30y;11ere M. & Hartman S.: What's Affirmative About Affirmative Action?• in Business Horizons September/October 1989: pp 
22-26: p 27. 
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programmes based on a group notion are the most popular and prevalent. Several reasons can be 
advanced for this. Firstly, it has the advantage of relative simplicity. Most people are easily identified as 
either male or female or as black or white. This ties up with the origin of affirmative action. Society first 
became aware of discrimination and its Injustice in the context of white-black relations. Affirmative action 
was a response to this realization. Thus it made sense originally to base affirmative action on this socially 
clear-cut black/white dichotomy. The addition of females as a protected group did not much complicate 
matters. It was also an easily monitored system in that all that the employer and enforcement agencies 
had to do was to do a black and white head count and compare this with statistics that in many cases 
were already available.31 This simplicity has, however, dissipated in recent years as more and more 
groups started to demand protected group status.32 A further complicating factor is the realization that 
apart from simple •main effects• discrimination, a person may also be the victim of double and/or 
compound discrimination and where there is discrimination against a group, the group should be 
entitled, on the logic of the group-based quota system, on designation as a protected group. This 
implies that it is no longer possible simply to do a head count, that is, to classify on the basis of easily 
identified external attributes, such as race or gender. 33 It is also difficult to imagine that a group-based 
quota system can cater for a protected group comprising compoundly discriminated against people; 
apart from the difficulty in identifying whether someone belongs to such a group, this could also have 
the effect of enlarging34 the number of protected groups beyond manageable numbers. 35 
4.6.2. Proportional quotas as an operationalisatlon of constitutional equality: According to one view, 
the organization has a duty to reflect in its workforce composition the demographics of the community 
in which it operates as it is dependent for its very existence on the community. Public institutions 
especially, have a duty to be staffed by the "politically appropriate" ratios, as they are the servants (and 
the creations) of the communities in which they are situated. These fair-share quotas may be based on 
racial population percentages or on other factors irrelevant to the predicted future performance of the 
applicants. The major problem with quotas is that the criterion performance of one group of appointees 
31 In order to determine "disparate impact" in discrimination cases or to determine ·underutilization• in contract compliance 
enforcement under Executive Order 11246. But see Section 3.3.1. supra forthe inappropriateness of using national racial/ethnic 
statistics in many situations. 
32See Peron (1992) and Glazer {(1991): p 22}. 
33 A male would normally have some difficulty qualifying himself for affirmative action entitlements by declaring that he belongs 
to the protected group of females. It would be much easier to declare himself a homosexual for the same purposes (this is not 
to say that his mere declaration of his sexual preferences would be unassailable, just that it will be more diffICult for an employer 
to determine a person's sexual orientation than hisjher physical gender). 
340pponents of affirmative action already allege that it "has degent?rated into a spoils system among competing racial and 
ethnic groups• {Abram M.B. (1991): p 38}. The implication Is that more and more primary groups will seek designation as 
protected group. 
35/f there are seven "main" protected groups (for example, gender, race, religion, age, disability, origin and sexual orientation), 
then the theoretical number of protected compound groups would be 119 (assuming ·race· to consist of only the black group) 
for a total of 126 groups/ 
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can be expected to be lower than that of another group. This may result In practice in a •revolving doof 
procurement policy, or an accumulation of employees from one group at the lowest ranks of the 
organization (because they ~ii to qualify for promotion). Worse, a company that deliberately reduces 
its admission standards to employ more blacks, may find itself In Court defending its promotion policies. 
Smith proposes that the proportionality criterion may be used to determine the constitutional limits of 
affirmative action.38 He suggests that any quota requirement exceeding the proportions of groups within 
the larger society may be unconstitutional because it is not designed to achieve equality. For Instance, 
legislation requiring 95% blacks in the civil service would be unconstitutional because the prescribed 
proportion exceeds the proportion of blacks found in South Africa.37 He tempers this headcounting 
endeavour somewhat by proposing that, should there not be sufficient numbers of blacks to fill the 
positions, the parity principle may be deviated from at the point where the appointment of unqualified 
blacks would be to the detriment of whites as well as blacks. 38 Smith concludes his article by stating 
that whites • ... should only be allowed to challenge affirmative action programmes on the ground that 
their rights are being infringed when they are being denied access to social resources that they would 
have been entitled to in a truly colour-blind society. IG9 This counter-factual situation must presumably 
be determined by reference to proportional demographics. 
4.6.3. Conclusion: Without stating the arguments in any detail, the main teleological arguments against 
affirmative action are in reality directed mostly at group-based quota systems, some of which can be 
summarized as follows: It increases racial divisions, lowers productivity, subverts the primacy afforded 
individual rights by the libertarian ethos, it is as immoral as discrimination, it is unconstitutional in that 
it operates in breach of the equality provision contained in most if not all constitutions40, it tends to be 
permanent, it stigmatizes its beneficiaries, it undermines democratic values and it is largely ineffective 
36Smith {1995): pp 91-101. 
377his means that whites can be unfairly burdened by affirmative action programmes - when they ant left with less than what 
they would have under conditions of genuine equality" [Smith (1995): p 96]. 
38Compant the insightful comments of Sen [(1992): p 137] in this regard: "Aggregative considerations can make us move in 
a different direction from equality in general. In concentrating on the programme of explaining the far-reaching role of basal 
equality ... we must not overlook the plurality of ethical concerns that take us beyond equality a/together. The distinction between· 
aggmgalille and distributive considerations has often been discussed in the specific context of assessing results (e.g. the conflict 
between increasing total income and reducing distributional inequalities in incomes, or between raising aggregate utility and 
decreasing interpersonal utility differences). But similar contrasts hold in other spaces as we// which may not involve any particular 
concentration on results as such. For example, there may be a conflict between promoting some rights in general (irrespective 
of distribution) and seeking a more equal distribution of those rights. Indeed, the aggregatiVfHiistributive dichotomy is one of the 
more pervasive issues in social evaluation. Equality- no matter how broadly defined can hardly be the only concern in any basal 
space, and aggregative considerations (including the demands of efficiency) tend to have an irreducible status.• 
39Smith {1995): p 101. 
40Cox P.N.: 7he Question of Voluntary' Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on the Judicial Role' in Arizona Law 
Review Vol. 23, 1981: pp 87-178. 
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in improving the lot of protected groups. Even If it is effective, it helps mostly those members of the 
protected group who are least in need of assistance ("it helps the wrong people"). The most telling 
arguments in favour of group-based quotas are its presumed simplicity and ease of monitoring as well 
as its alleged inverse moral equivalence with discrimination41 (that is, that it is a group-based remedy 
for a group-based wrong). 
4.7. AFRRMATIVE ACTION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
I wish to end this part of the chapter with some comments on the reluctance of (white) South African 
writers to address the Issue of whether affirmative action can ever amount to reverse discrimination 
(beyond a flat denial that "affirmative action is reverse discrimination• -- a conclusion which, but for its 
vacuity, I could fully endorse). It may well be that there is· a real fear that by admitting that not all forms 
of affirmative action can be benign discrimination, a commentator (especially If he is a supporter of 
affirmative action) may be tainted by this admission with being an opponent who professes support while 
in reality wishing to protect white privileges. Without pursuing this issue further, it is astounding how 
some of the most incisive legal minds in South Africa skirt this issue. 
Affirmative action is not discrimination in reverse, nor is it appropriate to apply the same requirement 
of neutrality, applicable in the domain of anti-discrimination regulation to affirmative action. This is so 
for two reasons. Firstly, to equate affirmative action with discrimination is fallacious as the aim of 
discrimination is to exclude, whereas affirmative action's aim is to include. Secondly, affirmative action 
requires positive action to overcome systemic, institutionalized discrimination, whereas anti-
discrimination laws are passive in the sense that they proscribe someone from indulging in certain types 
of behaviour (as opposed to mandating certain conduct, as is the case in affirmative action initiatives). 
Against a background of centuries of discrimination, anti-discrimination laws are perpetuating 
discrimination, rather than eliminating it42, and may indeed exacerbate inequality.43 
If the preceding evaluation of the conceptual distinction between affirmative action and reverse 
discrimination is valid, one could expect that, irrespective of the professed benign motive of any 
programme, in Its operation It must be inclusive rather than exclusive, otherwise it may amount to 
reverse discrimination. The US Supreme Court's reasoning in Bakke v Regents of the Universitv of 
41 Rosenfeld argues that whereas race and gender originally wem morally neutral, it gained derivalive moral significance by 
virtue of having been used as attributes whel8by to Identify tatpets for discrimination. Rosenfeld M. (1991): Affirmative Action And 
Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional lnquirv New Haven: Yale University Pmss. 
42Fullinwk:ler (1980): pp 171-172. 
43Atbettyn C. & Kentrk:lge J.: "Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution" in South African Journal on Human 
Rights Vol. 10, Part 2, 1994: pp 149-178: p 152. 
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California 438 U.S. 265 (1978) is a good example of an instance where an affirmative action programme 
was regarded as unconstitutional because it operated to exclude a person absolutely. In the ~ case 
the Court found the university's minority set-aside for admission to medical school to be an Illegal quota 
because it operated to exclude absolutely applicants from the majority group. The Court endorsed the 
Harvard University admissions system whereby race is only one factor among many, that are taken into 
account, when evaluating applications for admission. In the Court's view the Harvard system would be 
constitutional as it did not operate to exclude majority member applicants absolutely. This approach 
supports the individual-based socio-economic model referred to earlier.44 It is somewhat perturbing that 
some South African commentators seem to verge on the assertion that, In the South African context, 
discrimination against the privUeged can never amount to reverse discrimination, provided that it is in 
consequence of pursuing "the end of full equality. "'15 As a matter of law and morality, this cannot be 
correct. 
4.8. EQUALITY OF WHAT? 
Looking at the Constitution as a whole it seems clear that the Constitution does not prescribe measures 
to compel equality of outcome (as in a command economy) but allows for substantive equality of 
opportunity to promote the ideals of freedom and egalitarianism. Neither does the present government 
come out in favour of a commandist economy48 while it strongly condemns prevailing inequalities and 
shows a commitment to ameliorating these. Indeed, if regard is had to the rights and freedoms 
enumerated in Chapter 3, it is clear that any legislation purporting to introduce equality of outcome on 
a macro-economic scale would be unconstitutional. Support for this is to be found in the provisions 
relating to privacy47, economic activity48 and property49 indicating an endorsement for some form 
'"See Chapter 1. 
46AJbertyn & Kentridge (1994): p 162. Thll authors try to pTOtect themselves by saying that· .•. we are not saying that the 
Constitution always permits discrimination against privileged groups• (op cit}. But it is clear from the discussion that follows on 
this (disingeneous) disclaimer, that that is exactly what they are saying. 
48That is, a centrally planned economy, as opposed to a "frff.market" economy. 
47Section 13. Section 13 protects the individual from searchlls of his or hllr person, home or property or the seizure of his or 
her private possessions. Is a right to privacy possible without a right to property? 
48Section 28. (1) Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood anywhere 
in the national territory. (2) Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the protection or the improvement 
of the quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice, basic conditions of employment, fair labour practices 
or equal opportunity for all, provided such measures are justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality. 
49Section 28. (1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights In property and, to the extent that the nature of 
the rights permits, to dispose of such rights. (2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted othetWise than in 
accordance with a law. (3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such 
expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the payment of agreed compensation or, failing 
agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such period as may be determined by a court of law as just and 
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of freemarket economy (qualified In some respects by social justice considerations). Thus It can be 
stated that the Constitution promotes the (instrumental) value of equality of opportunity in pursuit of the 
(substantive) value of equality (the latter also being "instrumental" In the context of striving for the ideal 
of egalitarianism). In support of this conclusion I wish to advance the arguments of two writers 
(Mansfield and Hayek) why a government policy based on "equality of outcome" is undesirable, namely 
that It will undermine democracy and freedom. 
According to Mansfleld50 a constitutional democracy is based on the principles of public debate, 
persuasion and the consent of the governed; the affirmative action policies of successive American 
administrations violated these basic democratic values since affirmative action •never made its way 
through the legislative process with public notice and debate. 151 By focusing on equality of result, 
affirmative action encourages indifference to means as long as the desired end is achieved. Mansfield 
warns that violation of these procedural safeguards in a democracy in pursuit of the desired ends may 
lead to a norm that .,reedom is doing as one pleases, or doing what one thinks is required by 
justice. 152 Hayek argues in similar vein that the intrusion of the government into the private sphere to 
promote the ideal of equality of welfare, will inevitably lead to the loss of civil liberties and herald the 
coming of the totalitarian state.53 One could add to this that our Courts, when adjudicating on issues 
which in reality amounts to social engineering, should not stray too far from what the community would 
tolerate. In this regard our Courts could take heed of the following remarks by Devlin54: • ... the social 
service which the judge renders to the community is the removal of a sense of injustice.• Without the 
removal of this sense of injustice people may tum to terrorism, or, if enough people feel aggrieved to 
social unrest. That is why impartiality and the appearance of it are the supreme judicial virtues. •1n the 
course of their work judges quite often dissociate themselves from the law. They would like to decide 
equitable, taking into account all 19/evant factors, including, in the case of the detennination of compensation, the use to which 
the property is being put, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments In it by those affected and 
the intel9sts of those affected. 
50Mansfield H.C.: 7he Underhandedness of Affinnative Action•, in Nieli R. {Ed) (1991): Racial Prefe19nce And Racial Justice: 
The New Affinnative Action Controversy Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centl9: pp 127-140. 
51Mansfield {1991): p 127. 
52Mansfield {1991): p 139. 
537he g19at problem is whether this new demand for equality does not conflict with the equality of the rules of conduct which 
government must enforce on all in a free society. Thel9 is, of course, a g19at diffel9nce between government tl9ating all citizens 
according to the same rules in all the activities it undertakes for other purposes, and government doing what is 19quil9d in order 
to place the diffel9nt citizens in equal (or less unequal) material positions. Indeed, thel9 may arise a sharp conflict between these 
tM.o aims. Since people will differ in many attributes which government cannot alter, to secul9 for them the same material position 
would 19quil9 that government tl9at them very diffe19ntly. Indeed, to assul9 the same material position to people who differ g19atly 
in st19ngth, intelligence, skill, knowledge and perseverance as well as in their physical and social environment, government would 
clearly have to treat them very diffel9nt/y to compensate for those disadvantages and deficiencies it could not dil9Ct/y alter' {Hayek 
F.A {1982): Law. Legislatjon and Uberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy London: 
Routledge: Volume 2: 'The Mirage of Social Justice•: p 82]. 
54Devlin: •Judges and Lawmakers• in Modem Law Review Vol. 39, No. 1, January 1976: pp 1-16: p 3. 
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otherwise, they hint, but the law does not permit. They emphasise that it Is as binding upon them as 
it is upon litigants. If a judge leaves the law and makes his own decisions, even if in sustance they are 
just, he loses the protection of the law and sacrifices the appearance of Impartiality which is given by 
adherence to the law. He expresses himself personally to the dissatisfied litigant and exposes himself 
to criticism. But if the stroke is inflicted by the law, it leaves no sense of individual injustice; the losing 
party is not a victim who has been singled out; it is the same.for everybody, he says. 1156'58 This may 
be tricky In South Africa given our plurality of interests. Pluralism of competing values In our society 
necessitates the creation in the belief in the legal system and the legal process and this will demand a 
balancing act (between equity and equality notions of justice) from our judges when interpreting statutes 
and the Constitution and from the Judicial Services Comm.ission when appointing judges. A rights culture 
will be established only if the majority of each constituency in South Africa endorses the direction taken 
by the Constitutional Court. It can validly be postulated that in South Africa the disadvantaged group 
(predominantly black) subscribes to an equality notion of justice and the hitherto advantaged group 
(predominantly white) to an equity notion of fairness. The ambivalence In society about •justice" involves 
the conflict between two core values: individualism and egalitarianism. These values, recast in distributive 
terminology, result in a perception of justice somewhere between equity /merit and equality as pole 
values. Although it is argued that justice cannot be attained by making an exclusionary choice between 
either of these pole values, it cannot be said that even if such a selection were predicated on 
considerations of justice, that this would lead to a clear uncontentious solution to the distributive 
problem since the criteria whereby equity or equality is to be identified would still leave ample room for 
dispute. By nature man is neither an equity nor an equality theorist: both must be seen in their particular 
social and historical contexts. Our Constitutional Court will have to walk this tightrope between equity 
and equality. Devlin ends his discussion with an apocalyptic view (where he warns against the danger 
of judges adjudicating according to their precepts of justice), expressed in the following eloquent 
passage (strongly reminiscent of that of Hayek, eluded to before): "In evety society there is a division 
between rulers and ruled. The first mark of a free and orderly society is that the boundaries between 
the two should be guarded and trespasses from one side or the other independently and impartially 
determined. The keepers of these boundaries cannot also be among the outriders. The judges are the 
keepers of the law and the qualities they need for that task are not those of the creative lawmaker. The 
551bid: p 4. 
58Basson & Viljoen {(1988): pp 6-10/ make a similar point: "It is generally stated that legitimacy essentially implies 
acceptabilily. A sysiem of (constitutional) law which is acceptable (to the subjects), is a legitimale constitutional law syslem and 
its legitimacy in tum ensures the pennanency or tdability of the constitutional dispensation.• And "(l)egitimacy, consequently, is 
the acceptance of a specific constitutional dispensation by the community on the grounds of their 'sense of justice'. It is clear 
that this ethical modality, which determines the sense of justice of the community, implies those legal principles, according to 
which positive law is judged for its validity (in ierms of Dooyeweerd's theory of law). These legal principles then, represent an 
external value sysiem (which is based on the principle of justice in particular) and it is on the grounds of this normative syslem 
that Van der Vyvar evaluales the legitimacy of a system: the constitutional dispensation is legitimale (acceptable) when it satisfies 
the sense of justice which ought to exist in the community' {Sasson DA & Viljoen H.P. (1988): Suid-Afrikaanse Staatsrea Juta 
& Co. Ltd.: Cape Town/. 
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creative lawmaker is the squire of the social reformer and the quality they both need is enthusiasm. But 
enthusiasm is rarely consistent with impartiality and never with the appearance of it. ... Progressives 
are of course in a hurry to get things done and judges with their plenitude of power could apparently 
get them done so quickly; there seems to be no limit to what they could do if only they would 
unshackle themselves from their precedents. It is a great temptation to cast the judiciary as an elite 
which will bypass the traffic-laden ways of the democratic process. But it would only apparently be a 
bypass. In truth it would be a road that would never rejoin the highway but would lead inevitably, 
however long and winding the path, to the totalitarian state. 1157 
The arguments by Mansfield and Hayek and the warnings of Devlin should indicate that, if freedom and 
democracy are, next to equality, core values of our Constitution (and given the historical context in 
which the Constitution came into being, there is a strong presumption in this direction), the unbridled 
quest for equality of outcome can only be pursued at the grave risk of negating the constitutional values 
of democracy and freedom. 
4.9. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WHOM? 
WhUe agreeing with Smith's assertion that "(m)easures which help the individual will help the groupu58 
one can take issue with the underlying assumption of his broader argument which is based on the 
unreflective premise that section 8(3) is founded on a group-based notion of affirmative action (as 
opposed to individually based programmes).59 
Firstly, although most writers on and participants In the affirmative action debate assume group-based 
notions of affirmative action, the Constitution by no means proscribes other forms of affirmative action. 
As far as the wording of section 8(3)(a) is concerned it should be noted that it refers to "persons" as well 
as •groups• or "categories•. The inclusion of these classes of people who may have been the victims 
of unfair discrimination permits the following interpretation as far as affirmative action is concerned: 0) 
affirmative action may be employed to assist individuals; (ii) affirmative action may be based on groups 
or categories; and (iii) the Inclusion of the word •categories· (in addition to groups) opens the way for 
an interpretation which allows for affirmative action based on a classification going beyond that of the 
traditional group-based notions such as gender or ethnicity or race. In none of these is it a requirement 
that a specific group should be identified as being the perpetrators of the unfair discrimination or need 
a specific instance of discrimination be proven. Thus, generalised societal discrimination is sufficient to 
57Devlin (1976): p 16. 
58Smith (1995): p 90. 
59Smith (1995): pp 89-91. 
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entitle a person, group or category to affirmative remedial action. 
Indeed, the phrase •categories of persons" used in section 8(3) highlights the fact that categorization 
is a matter of convention rather than a given and this in turn leads to the conclusion that the act of 
classification Itself entails a selection of certain particular diversities rather than others. The undeniable 
fact that group-based analyses have been predominant does not preclude other typologies being 
developed to better suit the objectives of affirmative action. For instance, once It is admitted that race 
and gender, whatever their pragmatic and analytical virtues,80 are but derivative indicators of 
victimhood and that the true object of affirmative action should be to promote the interest of 
disadvantaged individuals in pursuit of the ideal of social justice or societal equallty,81 rather than the 
favouring of a specific race or gender group, then It follows that group-based notions of affirmative 
action are seriously flawed.82 The defect in group-based affirmative action is that It may not satisfy the 
proportionality requirement of the limitations clause and that there are less drastic measures to achieve 
the objects which will at the same time be more effective than the blunt instrument of group-based 
affirmative action. 
Secondly, the bland assertion that measures "which help the individual will help the group•, cannot be 
accepted without qualification. The fact is that group-based affirmative action programmes typically help 
the least disadvantaged members of a group without necessarily helping the group as a whole and I fail 
to see how this could be of any real help to the masses of uneducated indigenous black individuals who 
should be the real beneficiaries of affirmative action (and who are far more representative of the black 
group than the lucky few). The logic of this argument is that It is the wholly unqualified who are in real 
need of preferential treatment and not those at the top end of the social scale within the protected 
group. 83 Furthermore, It is open to question whether It is scientifically correct to ascribe all unexplained 
60
•1n fact, general analyses of inequality must, in many cases, proceed in terms of groups - rather than specific individuals -
- and would tend to confine attention to intergroup variations. In doing group analysis, we have to pick and choose between 
different ways of classifying people, and the classifications themselves select particular types of diversities rather than others • 
... The crucial relevance of such class-based classifications is altogether undeniable in the context of general political, social, 
and economic analysis• [Sen (1992): pp 117-118]. 
61
·1nequalities in the distribution of income and ownership will typically be part of the stoty, but by no means the whole of ;r 
[Sen {1992): pp 121-122]. 
62
•1n analyzing the relation between economic opportunities and freedoms, the tradition of classification based on the 
so-called Marxian classes can be quite inadequate. There are many other diversities and an approach to equality related to the 
fulfilment of needs or to ensuring freedoms has to go beyond purely class-based analysis. For example, even if inequalities based 
on property ownership are eliminated altogether, there can be serious inequalities arising from diversities in productive abilities, 
needs, and other personal variations. The case for going beyond class analysis was, in fact, persuasively made by Marx. {1875) 
himself ... • [Sen (1992): p 120]. 
63This will be true in many other spheres (e.g. university set-asides and affirmative sub-contracting), but not in all. For instance, 
affirmative programmes in basic health care and education probably will help the least advantaged members of society. It is 
interesting that these two examples are both instances of basic need fulfilment that could be applied to all members of society 
without necessitating a recourse to group-based affirmative action. 
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differences between two groups to a factor "X" and then to label that unknown factor84 "discrimination•. 
Such a methodology aprioristically assumes that groups may not on average diverge on other legitimate 
life choices and cultural values that may influence each oth~. It seems somewhat denigrating of the 
group to deny its right to culturally distinct characteristics. 
The conclusion is therefore that group-based affirmative action programmes do in fact favour the best 
qualified within the protected group, and if it is assumed that this is not the goal of affirmative action 
programmes, this Is a valid criticism. However, this is not a criticism that can be validly raised against 
affirmative action generally, but only against certain forms of affirmative action programme. An individual-
based socio-economic affirmative action model does not presuppose that it is completely clear-cut who 
should be responsible for the development of human resources. Rather, it recognizes that the upliftment 
of under- or undeveloped people will exact a tax from all sectors of society, but it leaves the decision 
of who will actually do the upliftment to the employer. Because of the inescapable flaws inherent in 
group-based notions of affirmative action, it is proposed that the proper •subject of equality't8B in the 
context of affirmative action should be the individual and not the group (the latter being but a handy 
indicator of possible discrimination rather than a direct measure of actual discrimination). 
4.10. SECTION 8 AND POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION 
To discriminate• ... is to fail to treat fellow human beings as individuals.1167 This being the case, we can 
conclude that it is beyond contention that affirmative action based on group membership as the only 
dimension of the personality O.e. to the exclusion of the richness of each person's Individuality and 
Individual circumstances) will amount to discrimination. But, as we have seen, our Constitution does not 
proscribe discrimination, only unfair discrimination. 68 Furthermore, section 8(3) allows for positive 
discrimination. The question then becomes whether discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups 
will always be fair, irrespective of the means chosen to advance this objective. This question raises a 
64See Finkelstein for a discussion of statistical techniques and the law and In particular the Issue of the "tainted variable 
objection" levied at multiple regression [Finkelstein M.O.: 7he Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex 
Discrimination Cases" in Columbia Law Review Vol. 80, 1980: pp 737-754: p 739]. 
85Peron questions the validity of the "assumption behind affirmative action ... that wealth disparities are simply the result of 
discrimination when there exists a great deal of evidence to show that other factors are far more impottant • (p 23). Examples of 
such factors discussed by Peron are differences in cultural values, in family lives, in occupational distribution, age distribution 
and whether a person lives in a rural or urban area [Peron {1992): pp 2~38]. Although some, if not all, of these factors will be 
affected by discrimination, it is not to be denied that they can have an independent main effect on wage differentials apart from 
their interactional effect. 
66See Section 2.2. supra. 
61Van Niekerk A: "Equality Rights and the New Act" in Cheadle H., Le Roux PAK, Thompson C. & Van Nlekerk A (1995): 
Current Labour LaW 1995 Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: pp 76-94: p 77. 
68See the discussion in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. supra. 
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host of subsidiary and fundamental questions, only some of which can be attended to in this discussion. 
It has been argued earlier that the benchmark established by our Constitution is substantive equality of 
opportunity rather than substantive equality of outcome. 88 As regards the latter it was said, however, 
that an egalitarian society can be seen as a constitutional aspiration or ideal. Substantive equality of 
opportunity being our starting point, we need to determine when a deviation from this principle will be 
allowed. Section 8(3) provides the answer, namely, a deviation from equality is permissible if it is 
designed to advance persons or groups disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. To say that a group has 
been disadvantaged can only have meaning in the most trivial sense, namely that everyone necessarily 
is a member of some group or other.70 Turning to individuals, it is equally obvious that not all South 
Africans were unfairly discriminated against, even if the majority of the members of particular groups 
were unfairly treated. In this regard one can think of the children of expatriate freedom fighters or non-
South African blacks who are now reaping the benefits of affirmative action. 71 It follows that individuals 
who have not been •disadvantaged by unfair discrimination• are not covered by section 8(3) and 
therefore that affirmative action programmes that confer advantage on such individuals will amount to 
an unconstitutional deviation from the equality principle. 
Based on the often drawn distinction between affirmative action and reverse discrimination, that the 
former is inclusionary whereas the latter is exclusionary, as welt as foreign case-law, one could also 
argue that affirmative action schemes which would have the effect of absolutely excluding non-
beneficiaries from competing for social goods,72 would fall outside the intended scope of section 8(3). 
For this reason group-based quota models of affirmative action can be discarded as unconstitutional. 
It is interesting that, according to a news report, the Eur~pean Court has recently ruled that • ... positive 
discrimination in favour of women by use of quotas is, in effect, sex-discrimination against men. •73 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that, in terms of section 8(3), affirmative action models 
would be constitutional only if they were designed In such a way that they would come to the assistance 
of actual victims of past discrimination (seen in its broadest sense as including general societal 
discrimination and not requiring the identification of an actual perpetrator), since section 8(3) limits 
affirmative measures to that category of persons. The reference to •groups or categories" in section 8(3) 
can be interpreted as an indication that group or category membership may be taken into account when· 
89Section 4.8. supra. 
70See the discussion in Section 4.4. supra. 
71 It would be interesting to know how many black academics at South African universities are South Africans. 
72See Section 4.7. supra. 
73
•European Court 'no' to job quotas for women• in The Star. 18 Oc;tober 1995. 
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Identifying those disadvantaged individuals. It must be remembered that race and/or gender are in 
themselves not badges of dlsadvantagement (except for racists and male chauvinists), but are simply 
used as presumptive indiciae of unfair discrimination for the purpose of easy Identification. Viewed as 
such, race and gender can be seen in their proper perspective, namely, as being useful to Identify 
victims of unfair discrimination, but not by themselves constituting conclusive proof of discrimination. 
What can then constitute such proof? For this we have to tum to the aspirational value our Constitution 
confers on substantive equality. It Is submitted that indicators of socio-economic deprivation combined 
with the presence of Indirect lndiciae of deprivation are sufficient to qualify a person as being entitled 
to the benefits of affirmative action. Therefore, an indigent black female would be an appropriate 
beneficiary of affirmative action, not because she is a black pel'$0n or a woman, but because she is a 
black woman who is, In real terms in a disadvantaged position. Her race and gender will create a 
presumption of unfair discrimination but it is her actual material circumstances that will confirm this 
presumption and make her entitled to affirmative action assistance.74 Conversely, an indigent white 
male may well qualify for a lesser form of affirmative action if he possesses certain indiciae of socio-
economic disadvantage, such as having grown up in a poor home or area. 75 The constitutional ideal 
of substantive equality compels us to ameliorate all forms of real disparities, not by presumption but by 
looking at the actual positions of individuals, Irrespective of their group membership (although, as 
Indicated earlier, group membership may assist us in Identifying disadvantaged individuals and may be 
used to categorise Individuals according to the quantity of affirmative action society may be prepared 
to expend on them). 
4.11. SECTION 33(1) AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Having concluded in the previous section that group-based and quota-based affirmative action models 
may be unfair and unconstitutional in terms of section 8, it still remains to be determined, in the event 
that I am wrong in this, whether these models of affirmative action may not fall foul of section 33. 78177 
74Because of the problems of establishing a causative correlation betvtieen socio-economic status and discrimination on the 
individual level as an empirical fact, this inferential process is proposed. Of course, in cases of direct discrimination actual 
discrimination as causative factor will have to be established. 
75Because of the endemic (and in the case of blacks, structural) discrimination against women and blacks, it would be easier 
in their case to justify the causative inference than it would be for the example of the white male mentioned in the text. 
76/t should be noted that this discussion of s 33 is veiy incomplete and selective. To do justice to the complexities presented 
by s 33 falls way beyond the scope of this research paper. 
77The relevant provision of the /imitation clause reads as follows: "33. Umilalion.-(1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter 
may be limited by law of general application, provided that such limitation-
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is-
(i) reasonable; and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and ... • 
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A Bill of Rights typically contains basic rights that may conflict with one another in their application. A 
Court will have to decide which protected right enjoys priority in such an instance. For example, the right 
to equal treatment (used in America by civil rights groups to demand school integration) may come into 
conflict with the right to associate (used by white parents to maintain segregated schools). In Brown v 
Board of Educators78, the American Supreme Court gave priority to the right to equality. The limitation 
clause would be central to any dispute over the alleged infringement of a fundamental right because 
conflicting rights will almost always be at issue. It will only be when the defence is based on a denial 
1that the fundamental right has been infringed that the issue will not tum on a balance of rights in terms 
! 
of section 33. 
4.11.1. Unfair yet reasonable limitation: In the ensuing discussion the process and application 
envisaged by section 33 is given In broad outline by using the example of a white male challenging a 
group-based affirmative action scheme on the basis of section 33. The process in applying section 33 
can be divided into the following two phases: In the first phase the applicant bears the onus of showing 
that a fundamental right or freedom of his has been infringed. In determining the veracity of this 
allegation a court will first have to determine the scope of the right in question, and, secondly, determine 
if the right has been infringed. 79 Should the applicant succeed in this, the party invoking the limitations 
provision must then show that the restriction is consonant with the limitations clause. 80 Satisfying this 
burden requires two things81 : firstly it must be shown that the interest underlying the limitation is of 
sufficient Importance to outweigh the fundamental right, and, secondly, it must be shown that the means 
used to further this interest are in proportion to the object of the limitation. Moving to the proportionality 
requirement, and without surveying foreign jurisdictions, it can be stated that, for the purposes of this 
research and following the exposition provided in Cachalia i!...il. 82 it is accepted that the test as 
pronounced in R v Oakes 26 DLR (4th) 200, will apply. The proportionality test as proposed in the Oaks-
case consists of three components: (i) the limitation must be rationally connected to its objective; (ii) 
the limitation must impair the right or freedom as little as possible; and (iii) there must be proportionality 
between the effects of the limitation and its objectives.83 In the context of possible affirmative action 
legislation an application of the preceding will entail answering the following questions: Firstly, is the 
78347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
79See Cachalia et al (1994): pp 106-109 and the Canadian case law cited by the authors. Also see Spitz D.: •Eschewing 
Silence Coerced by Law: The Political Core and Protected Periphery of Freedom of Expression• in South African Jqumal on Human 
Rights Vol. 10, Part 3, 1994: pp 301-335. 
80Cachalia et al (1994): p 107 & pp 109-116. 
81 It is of course rather difficult to give content to the phrase •reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on frffdom and equality", but luckily we can have recourse to foreign jurisdictions to enlighten us. 
82Cachalia et al (1994): pp 105-116. 
83Cachalia et al (1994): p 112. 
53 
government objective of sufficient Importance? Secondly, are the means (the modality of affirmative 
action contained in the statute) rationally connected to the objective? Thirdly, are the rights and 
freedoms of non-beneficiaries of the affirmative action legislation Infringed as little as possible? And 
lastly, are the costs to the non-beneficiaries outweighed by the benefits to the beneficiaries of the 
legislation? 
Applying the preceding process to the example of the white male launching a constitutional attack on 
a group-based affirmative action scheme, the argument could be structured as follows (for the purposes 
of our example we are assuming that the applicant has su.cceeded in showing that his fundamental right 
to equality in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) has been infringed and that such infringement is not saved 
by section 8(3)84 and that the sponsor of the affirmative action programme now relies on section 33 
as a justifiable infringement of the applicant's equality rights)85: 
(i) Sufficiently important objective: What would constitute a sufficiently important objective is 
somewhat uncertain, but given our history and the pervasive and gross disparities present in our 
society there can be little doubt that affirmative action with the objective of making our society 
more egalitarian and promoting reconciliation will satisfy this requirement. However, objectives 
such as compensatory justice arguments or objectives amounting to reverse discrimination, 
would be, for reasons previously expounded, be unconstitutional. Assuming that the sponsor 
of the affirmative action model under attack has satisfied ·this ends-test, the Court will then move 
to the means used. 
(Ii) The limitation must be rationally connected to its objective: Our disgruntled white male will 
point out that group-based affirmative action programmes do not advance the egalitarian 
objective in that such programmes have proved elsewhere to in fact increase the disparities 
within groups. He would also point out that group-based programmes do nothing (or very little) 
for the most disadvantaged members of the disadvantaged group. For these arguments he 
could adduce an abundance of research and statistical evidence from the US. 
(iii) The limitation must impair the right or freedom as little as possible: Depending on the 
nature of the group-based affirmative action model, the applicant may argue, in the case of a 
quota-model, that there are other ways of achieving the objectives of affirmative action that will 
84The applicant could base his arguments on many of the bases discussed in preceding chapters: that the affirmative action 
scheme has the effect of promoting the interests of persons not unfairly discriminated against [i.e. that it does not fall under s 
8(3)]; that it excludes white males absolutely [i.e. that it amounts to reverse discrimination and as such infringes his equality rights 
enshrined in s 8(1) and s 8(2)]. It should be noted that this line of attack does not imply that s 8(3) is a /imitation of the equality 
clause (and therefore not a realisation of equality): it is based on the argument that s 8(3) provides for the pursuit of substantive 
equality subject to certain preconditions. 
85See ·unfairness and reasonableness· in the text infra regarding the relationship between •unfair discrimination" in s 8 and 
·reasonableness• in s 33. Can a respondent contend that the affirmative action programme is unfair discrimination in terms of 
s 8 but is nevertheless •reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality" in terms 
of s 33(1)? 
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have less of an impact on his equality rights. He could also point out that an individual-based 
affirmative action model wUI be less destructive of his freedom of choice. In essence this leg of 
the argument will entail convincing the Court that there are less Intrusive ways of achieving the 
objective. As has been argued throughout this paper, an Individual-based affirmative action 
scheme should, if accepted as a workable option by the Constitutional Court, suffice to sink 
group-based models at this stage of the enquiry. 
(iv) There must be proportionality between the effects of the limitation and its objectives: The 
applicant could advance the argument that the gains the most disadvantaged members of the 
beneficiary group (i.e. those who are in reality the people who stand to gain the least or nothing 
from the affirmative action programme) stand to realise as a consequence of the affirmative 
action scheme, and the disadvantages he stands to suffer, the scheme Is disproportionate. If 
a strong variant of affirmative action is at issue, the applicant may also argue that, even if the 
outcome of the cost-and-benefit analysis as between his losses and the gains of the least 
disadvantaged members of the beneficiary group is inconclusive, the efficiency costs to the 
economy as a whole, should swing the scale against the programme. In the case of a moderate 
variant of affirmative action, the applicant would, in all likelihood, not succeed in his attack at 
this stage of the enquiry. If this variant of affirmative action is at issue, he would have to base 
his attack on the group-based model by comparing it to the individual-based model during 
stages (ii) and (iii) of the enquiry.88 
4.11.2. Unfairness and reasonableness: The problem in applying section 33 in the context of 
affirmative action is that one first has to work through the internal structure of section 8 to ascertain 
whether a situation is possible where an affirmative action programme could be unfair discrimination in 
terms of section 8(2), even though it falls within the ambit of section 8(3). Davis,87 as_ well as Albertyn 
and Kentridge88 would say that any affirmative action programme that complies with section 8(3) will 
be fair automatically and will not be susceptable to section 33 scrutiny. As argued previously, this cannot 
be correct, since the means as well as the ends of a programme must be constitutional.88 In order to 
be constitutional the means must satisfy the effectiveness requirement of section 8(3),90 but also not 
infringe the right not to be discriminated against guaranteed by section 8(2). It has already been argued 
861n the case of an affirmative actjon programme that operates to exclude absolutely a privileged group (such as white males) 
one could also argue that it contravenes s 33(1) since it negates the essential content of certain rights, for example, the right to 
equality and the right to economic activity. Since the •essential content" concept Is a controversial one, this line of argument is 
not further developed in this discussion. 
87Davis (1994). 
88AJbertyn and Kentridge (1994). 
89See Chapter 2. 
00see the discussion of the meaning of "designed to achieve" in Section 3.4. supra. 
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that certain forms of affirmative action may be very effective but would nevertheless be unconstitutional 
because It would amount to unfair reverse discrimination. 91 Du Plessis and Corder base the immunity 
of affirmative action against section 33 scrutiny on the argument that section 8(3) does not entrench a 
"right •. 92 This reasoning is flawed because it only looks at affirmative action from the beneficiary's 
perspective. This is nonsensical since It can only make sense to talk of affirmative action In the context 
of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Conceptually affirmative action in a universum consisting of 
beneficiaries only is an impossibility, the action embarked upon must affirm the position/treatment of 
one group as against another group. Recognising that non-beneficiaries are inextricably part of the 
notion of affirmative action, leads to the conclusion that section 8(2) protects the rights of non-
beneficiaries In the context of affirmative action. Thus, whereas section 8(3) may be immune from section 
33 scrutiny, if viewed from the perspective of beneficiaries, section 8(2) still operates to protect the rights 
of non-beneficiaries (whose interests form an integral part of the notion of affirmative action). On this 
analysis, an affirmative action programme in compliance with section 8(3)(a) may nevertheless be found 
to be unfair discrimination in breach of section 8(2), yet be found to be reasonable and justifiable in 
terms of section 33(1).93 "Unfairness• and "reasonableness" should not be confused94, the former is 
an aspect of justice whereas the latter falls more properly within the domain of policy considerations and 
political morality.95 Some actions may be unfair as a matter of "simple justice between man and man", 
but nevertheless reasonable as a matter of abstract political morallty.96 
4.12. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have tried to show that although the most popular conception of affirmative action as a 
group-based remedy for a group-based wrong, has the benefit of simplicity, it is flawed from both an 
91See the discussion in Section 3.4., Section 4.7. and Section 4.10. supra. 
92Du Plessis L & Corder H. {1994): Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.: p 145. 
As was stated before (Chapter 3, footnote 71), these authors argue that s 8(3){a) does not confer a right {because, so the 
argument goes, it merely allows for the possible future introduction of affirmative action programmes rather than creating a right 
to affirmative action). Thus, since the limitation clause provides for the· limitation of "rights" {rather than possible •entitlements"), 
s 33 is not applicable to s 8{3){a). 
93For example, affirmative action In favour of blacks may satisfy the requirements of s 8(3) but may operate to exclude v.omen 
unfairly, yet may be reasonable and justifiable in terms of s 33 because of limited resources. To deny that affirmative action can· 
ever be unfair is dishonest. Ukewise, to deny that such unfairness may sometimes be justifiable given an imperfect v.orld with 
limited resources, is unrealistic. 
941 do not use these v.orris here in their traditional administrative law or labour law context. 
95The v.orris "in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality" anchor •reasonable" and "justifiable" in a 
certain conception of the just society; by contextualising it thus, it becomes a question of political morality rather than one of 
fairness in the abstract. 
96/t is much easier to justify the "fairness• of affirmative action as an abstract ethical Issue than to explain to a real person on 
an individual basis why he is mistaken in regarding the adverse effects of an affirmative action programme on his job security 
and prospects as being unfair to him, to one's own satisfaction. 
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ethical and a logical perspective and can be attacked on constitutional grounds. The fact that South 
African commentators have not addressed the issues raised against this popular (but not the only) 
version of affirmative action, may be ascribed to the (real) fear that this may make them vµlnerable to 
the stigmata associated with libertarian and/or racist sentiments. That this inference is unwarranted in 
the case of opposition to group-based models of affirmative action is clear, if the objections are founded 
upon an alternative model of affirmative action that would advance the constitutional ideals of equality, 
freedom and reconcUiation much more effectively. It was proposed that an individual-based socio-
economic model of affirmative action is just such an alternative. It is in testing the group-based model 
against section 33 of our Constitution that this alternative vision of an appropriate model for South Africa 
could be most effectively used by opponents of group-based initiatives. 
An important aspect of the argument advanced in this research has been the notion that when 
interpreting the Constitution, one must distinguish between the aspirational values imbued in the 
Constitution and the constitutional means allowed to further these ideals. The latter will entail finding 
means that infringe upon other constitutional rights as little as possible, while advancing the 
commonwealth (or at least impinging as little as possible on all persons' collective interest in their 
society not being subjected to measures which would, on a utility analysis, reduce the commonwealth 
in pursuit of the egalitarian aspirational value endorsed by the Constitution). 
Thus far I have been attacking group-based modalities of affirmative action from the perspective of white 
males, but is it also possible that this form of affirmative action may indeed be bad for those groups 
whom this form of affirmative action is supposed to help? I would think yes, since it is my conviction that 
such a model will do nothing for the people most in need of assistance in our society. Suppose after 
a number of years of vigorous implementation of variou~ forms of group-based affirmative action, our 
society obtains race and gender proportionality in the distribution of jobs (to take but one social good). 
Based on present demographics, roughly 86% of all jobs will then be held by blacks (defined as those 
who are not white) and approximately 52% by women. According to the dictates of the group-based 
model the need for affirmative action would at this stage fall away. Yet, based on current population 
figures and available jobs, it Is evident that this will leave a large number of people who were unfairly 
discriminated against who would not have tasted any tangible benefits from section 8(3) of our 
Constitution. Unfortunately for them they would have missed their opportunity since affirmative action 
would terminate once proportional parity has been obtained.97 Not so in the case of an individual-based 
socio-economic model, which seeks to address instances of actual individual deprivation by awarding 
employers for employing and developing persons finding themselves at the bottom of the society; which 
97Proportionality is, according to Smith, the acid test for the (un)constitutionality of affirmative action [Smith (1995)/. A more 
nuanced concept of proportionality (than straight head counting based on national population figures) could entail a redefining 
of the universums to be compared (e.g. the proportion of blacks in a particular recruitment area who have specific minimum 
qualifications). 
57 
recognizes that forms of societal discrimination may be so pervasive and subtle as to elude the 
constitutional categories listed in section 8(2); and which does not operate under a suspensive condition 
of proportionality (but sees affirmative action as a permanent corrective in a free market economy). One 
may well ask what good such a scheme will do, given the assumption of a fD<ed number of jobs? The 
answer to this is threefold: Firstly, If affirmative action is built upon the precept of proportionality of 
redress, It seems ethically more justifiable to focus on the people who have suffered the greatest unfair 
discrimination rather than implementing a scheme that would in effect realise an inverse relationship 
between conferment of benefits and the degree of unfairness suffered. Secondly, promoting the 
distribution of jobs to the least developed members of society may stimulate the development of the 
human potential of those Individuals by their employers and would at the same time force those better 
equipped to fend for themselves to strike out on their own (i.e. better qualified people, irrespective of 
their group membership, have a better chance of successfully starting their own businesses), thereby 
increasing the total number of job opportunities available. Thirdly, given that group-based models have 
proved themselves to increase the within-group disparities in the beneficiary group, the individual model 
will promote the constitutional ideal of egalitarianism better. 
Lastly, the values of liberty and efflciency,98 although they may, constitutionally speaking, be of a lower 
order than that of equality, should not be totally negated in the name of the constitutional ideal of 
equality. The importance of freedom of choice, in particular as It relates to affirmative action In the field 
of employment, would be disregarded at our economic peril.99 But the inequalities present in our 
society would seriously endanger socio-political stability in our country, If left unaddressed. Balancing 
equity and equality notions of distributive justice is the difficult task facing us If we wish to avoid the twin 
dangers of economic stagnation on the one hand and social instability on the other. Our Constitution 
provides us with the guidelines to succeed in this precarious balancing act by elevating neither equality 
nor liberty to a position of unassailable supremacy over the other. 
96Although 'efficiency" is not to be found as a "fundamental right" in Chapter 3 of Act 200 of 1993, efficiency considerations 
cannot be ignored in the pursuit of equality {see in this regard Dworkin (1987); Sen (1992); Hayek (1982); and Smith (1995) - the 
latter arguing that an extnlme form of affirmative action (i.e. a scheme whereby the wholly incompetent are to be hired) would not 
be to the advantage of the supposed beneficiaries of the affirmative action scheme, and would, on these grounds, be 
unconstitutional]. Also, many of the fundamental rights contain, for their effective enjoyment, a veiy substantial substantive 
component [e.g. rights relating to children, the environment, legal representation, etc], so that it could be argued that in a cost-
and-benefit analysis in terms of s 33, any state-sponsored intervention that significantly harms the economy, harms the full and 
equal enjoyment of those rights which require substantive resources. 
99See Section 4.5. supra. 
